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CHAP'l'ER I
THE FUR rr'RADE AND THE FRONTIKR SOCIETY

The best known and otten-debated doctrine of American history
was enunciated by Frederick Jackson Turner.

Turner, in an attempt

to analyze the effect of America's move westward upon social and
political growth, delineated certain clear steps of the advancing
American frontier.

One of these steps involved the role of the

fur trade and traders upon the civilization and settlement of the
Old Northwest.

/1'

~iTurner
,

tound that in the Northwest " • • • the

j'"

trading posts became the nuclei of larger set tlement. ;

..~

the

traders' trails grew into early roads, and their portages marked
out the location for canals.

Little by little the tur trade was

undermining the Indian society and paving the way for the entrance
of civilization."l

Turner also realized that the fur trader hin-

dered the advancement of the frontier.

The traders had a vested
•

!

interest in sustaining frontier conditions, he said, since the j;':!
/

end ot the frontier also would signal the end of the fur trad ••
Nevertheless, by exploring the new country and introducing goods
to the Indians, the trader initiated frontier

Change.~
.,It<#.?

Since Turner's period of productive writing in American
history, there has been anything but a unanimity of opinion on the
role of the fur trade.

Paul C. Phillips, who wrote the supposedly

definitive work on the fur trade in American history, stated his
position quite clearly:

"The attractive hypotheSis of Frederick

Jackson Turner offered no guide.

Fur traders and trappers had no

2

interest in the settlement of land and pioneer communities, and
held rew political or social ideas that might influence established communities. H3 An historian of the far western fur trade,
however, agreed with Turner.

Clarence Vandiveer found that the

advance of settlement followed directly in the paths marked out by
the fur traders.

Quite correctly, Vandiveer claimed that a great

h~ber of our cities began their existence as fur trade posts. 4
Many historians have been content to say that cities began
their lives as fur trade posts never considering the implications
of such a generalization.

In approximately a twenty year period,

1815-1835, the whole economic and social structure of the Old
Northwest was altered from a fur trade or frontier society to an
emerging urban community.
frontier society?

What was the nature of this changing

What contributions did the fur trade and fur

traders make to frontier development?

This thesis narrows the

consideration of the fur trade to Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green
Bay.

Beginning in 1815, when the fur trade knew its wealthiest

years, and ending in 1838, when the vanguard of a new civilization
arrived to exploit the land and

commert~ial

potential of these

midwestern areas, this study focuses on the transitional period
of the American fur trade.
Attempting to discover the nature of the fur trade society
includes many elements which constituted the early history of the
Northwest Territory.

The role of the military, the Indians, the

government factory system, and the communities of early inhabi-

/

3
tnnts Are nIl intimntely oonnectnd with the fur trade.
The 1"!lilitnrJ"s role in the advancement of the frontier has
1>een the sUb1ect
of sevo:r-nl detc.iled studies.
..
~:n,'T',mar:tzed

5

Dne au.thor has

tho contribution of the mili tnry as providing the

(ttmosphero or socuri ty so thnt settlers could occupy the ceded and
6
the unceded lands o.f the Indtans.
Tiw military post lUte the .fur
trnde

~ost

nrovided a focal Doint for settleMent on the rapidly

expanding frontier.
of a

prota~onist.

The military, in this study, assumes the

~ole

Military posts established at Green Bay and

Chicago did not noticeably increa.se the economic or aocial stability ot the fur trade.
The national government realized that the potential greatneas of the frontier necessitated more than military control.
The Indians's supposed savagery

8S

well as his natural title to

the .fertile lands o.f the Northwest required a two-sided policy.
On the one hend, the government wished to advance the civilizing
process of its rod brothers While, at the same time, extinguishing
their title to the land needed for the white settlers.
on the frontier to
Indian agents.

admi~ister

this

two~sided

Arriving

policy were the

The Indian agents were commissioned to arrange

treaties for the ss.le of land, to distribute presents to the
Indians, and, in general. to act as a stabilizing int"luence between white and Indian. 7 Perhaps their most important duty vas
in regulating the trade of' white inhabitants with the Indians.
Since the earliest history of the country, French and British

4
traders had bartered, boueht, and stolen the rich harvest of turs
obtained by the Indians.

The Indian agents were not to prohibit

this trade but merely to foster its proper oonduct.

This again

represented only onf:) aspect of United dtates Indian polic,- - that
ai.de which sought to protect the Indians while simultaneously
aiding the fur trader and whtte settler.
To advance the civilization of the Indians. anothar aspect
of United States Indian policy was also pursued.

In 1795, the

government inaugurated the tactory system to regulate trade with
the Indians.

Its most distinguished aim was admittedly humani-

tarian, tor the factory was a government store established on the
frontier to bu,- the Indian's furs at fair prices.

In return, the

government tactor would supply the Indians with usetul commodities
8
at cost.
The factory vas not established to bring profits but
to end the exploitation and gradual improverishment of the
Indians.

Yet the factor,- system provided the context for bitter

debates snd arguments during the frontier period.

The factory

was greeted with contempt by the original inhabitants.

'nlese

people obtained their erJono:mic Ii velih.)od f.rom the fur trade, and
the tactory was established to capture the Indian
supposedly unscrupulous hands.

tr~lde

fI'om their

The factory system and its area

head, the government factor, were also in conflict with the military commanders and Indian agents.

While the government factor

attempted to capture the Ind.ianls furs, the ,.Indian ar:ent was
dispensing licenses for white traders.

In effect, the government

factor and the Indian E:gent were in direct opposition.

The

factory system eventually collapsed in 1822, due partially to
"'"rontier hostility and the inconsistent policy of' tho governm(;nt. 9
The original French end British inhabitants were essential
ingredients of the frontier community.
comMunities such

a~

These settlers of froIltier

Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green Day were not

A1'I'lerio.Eins nor before the War of 1812 had they any connt:c tion with
the Amerioan government.

Before the War of 1812, the Northvest

Territory was still partially under British control.

The majority

of inhabitants were of British end French extraction, loyal to the
British government. 10 Their pattern of life was in many respects
idyllic.

Enduring hardships during the winter months in obtaining

furs, the sunmler was spent in carefree and lighthe&rted enjoyment
of life.

Their society was
~~~."~

___ ,.

0--'-""·_'-'"

interdepen<!~I.l:~.

Most families inter-

., ___ ""_

married among themselves and with the Indians.
went

B

This society under·

rapid change during the years covered by this study.

1835, the frontier outpost was changed entirely.

By

The arrival ot

oommeroial and farming immigrants from the East bore witness to
the ps.ssage of the fur tr'ade society.

Tr.lis change began in 1815.

The most potent force in the changing
the Ame~~c,ElEI.

r'uz,-

Com~,!I.~Y.

fr()nti(!r~o!lllnunitl ~,~.s

Before l8lS, the fur trade of the

Northwest Territory had teen exploited by both American and Britis}
citizens with only the small capital investments at the individual
traders and a few Canadian firms.

John J. Astor, however, beoame

the first of Amerioa's giant capitalists.

He realized the

6
enormous profits which the fur trE,de beld for a centrelly organized compEiny.

In 1811, Astor entered into

Ii

partnership with t.wo

f.ri tlsh companies which supplit,d goods to mt;l')Y traders of the

rortbwest.

vlben tbe territory

pc'ssesslon efter tr. . e Conventiln

WflS

flnelly

desi~nE',t.ed

or 181e, Astor

an

Am(~rican

forrned the Amc!r-

ieEm Fur Company to exploit the trade of this erea.

Through the

direction of Astor's two chief &gents, Hemsny Crooks find Robert
Stuart, the American Fur Company became the focal point of the fur

trade community for nearly twenty years.

CHAPTER II

FRONTIER SOCIETY IN CHICAGO,

MILWAuK~~,

AND GREEN dAt, 1815-1817

The War of 1812 brought considerable hardship to the young
society at Caicago.

Before the War and the terrible Dearborn

Massacre, the population of Chioago oonsisted mainly of the
mi1ita~y

personnel at Fort Dearborn and a few orivate traders,

the most successful of whom was John Kinzie.

During the War, the

majority of these citizens had fled in the face of Indian attacks
instigated by the British.
to the Chicago area.

In 1815, these citizens drifted back

John Kinzie, being a leading citizen, was

recommended for the post of Indian agent by Lewis Cass, Governor
of the Michigan 'erritory.
Charles Jouett in 1816.

1

The post was eventually given to

The population was increased by the

arrival of a new contingent of soldiers tor Fort Dearborn.

Soon

after, the Chicago factory was established under the direction of
2
Jacob Varnum.
The fur trade attracted the usual local traders
as well as the Connant and Mack Company of Detroit.

This company

dispatched John Crafts with a large capital to exploit the fur
trade of the Chicago area. 3
Chicago was unique among the communities of this study.
Since before the War of 1812, it had been under American influence.

Even though Chicago was a small

co~~unity

there was a

distinction between British and American elements.

The Indians

were clearly under British influence as evidenced by their conduct during the War.

The principal British trader, John Kinzie,

7

8
was on(; of

U"~e

Mas eaCl'e •

1'h.is be t tle took the Ii '\{e s of' a. great perccnt6.ge of

.

ch~cago

few people whom thu InCLiar.a spareel in the Dearborn

res 1-nen t s. ~

Green Bay was a much larger settlemunt than Chicago.

~hile

Chicago had barely thirty inhabitsnts outside the military perI

sonnel, Green Bay had a population of net less than 250 supported
by two trading stores, three blacksmiths, a tailor, aue.
t:'

tar.'"

carpen-

fl

Unlike Chicago in the number of its population, Green Buy

was also dissimilar in the nature of its population.

There was no

Americun influence on the Green Bay area before 1815.

The Green

Bay residents were either of British or French descent and intimately connected with British interests.

John Lawa, Jacque

Porlier, and the Grignon brothers, the principal citizens and fur
jradera, wore either born in England or raised in Canada.

f

They

were supplied in the fur trade by the Southwest Company of Canada
which was represented by Robert Dickson and Jacob Franks.
Viewed locally, the War of 1812 was fought for two reasons.
The War attempted to end Indian treachery supposedly prompted by
the British.

Secondly, the War sought to eliminate the British

influence over the Indian trade in the Northwest Territory.7
~he

Bay.

War, therefore, was directed against the residents of Green
lbey were British traders and had a great deal of influence

with the Indians.

To protect their interests, the Green Ba,.

traders, under Colonel Dickson, organized the Indians of the area
to fight on the British side.

a

Green Bay was a major depot for

9

s taring of
War. 9

:~'ri tlsh

mill tal'! f.pl.pplies for the l'lorthwest during the

After the War of 1812, the residents of Oreen Bey were, for
the first time, subJectad to American influence.

Fort Howard was

erected in 1816 to protect tho citizens of the territory as well
10
as to control the largely British population.
In lel6, John
Bowyer assumed tho duties ot Indian agent for Green Bay.

In the

sam,e year, Matthew Irwin arrived from the Ea.st to tske charge c,t

the new Green Bey factor,..

Unlike Chic.ego, lihic.h had a factory

before the '-liar, this was the first attempt to regulate the Indian
trade of the Green Eay area.

The predominately British population

resentEid the arrival of the United States mil1.tary forces and the
factory.

Despite its humanitarian aires, the factory was, in tact,

established at Green Bay to contrel the Indian trade which meant
reducing the profits of the Green Bay citizens.
Milwaukee, in 1815, was the sP'ls.lles t of the three communi ties
In tect, Milwaukee until late in the 1820's could herdly be con8ider~d

anything but an occasiotll1.1 fur trading area.

In the. ('Jarl,.

nineteenth century nUllle:;:OU8 traders were known to have lived at
Milwaukee such as Jea.n Beaubien, Leurent Fily, Andrew J. V1eem,
and Joseph LaFraMboise.

These traders occupied MilwaUkee during

the trading season While durin€: the summer months the arefl
vacant. i1

WEtS

S•• omon JUlleau and Andrew J. Vieau, two of the roost

prominent traders of this area, firat traded at; tUlwElukEle in 1818

while maintaining their permanent residence in Green Bay.

12

10

were

ac justiTlF

to post-war concH ti ens, John Jacob Astor formu-

] !lted the policies and ol"gani.zatlon of the A-lJerlcan Fur CC!'1ptony.
In le11, Astc-r had conclnded an ngreement with

tl(O

rAnies for tho trade of the Northwest Territory.
\In.s to lest for

rl~Te

British comThis 9gree-nent

years or tmtll su.ch time as the American

govcrmr.ent prohibited Eri tish trs,ders from the Northwf'>st Terri-

tory.13

When, on April 29, 1816, the United States government

pessed a law probibi ting forei€mers from the Illdian trade, Astor
took sole possession of the trade. 14
pu~ehased

Tn 1817, he officially

the Canadian share of the Southwest Company in which

he had been a partner.

Astor did not immediately intervene l.n

the Indian trade of the Northwest. bu.t he maintained the fecede
of the Southwest Company since it hed .for many years sustained

er.ce11ent rel&tlons with the British trsders in A1'I"ericfl.n terrltory.15
From 181$-1818, Astor orp:flnized the ac:lmin1.strfltive aspects
of the new American Fur Company.

Robert. Stuart and RamSEY Crooks

were employed to mane.fe the bus iness op-er&.tions.

Headquarters

were est.ablished at Mackinac for the collection of furs end the
disbursement of goods to the various traders in the interior.
From Mackinac, outfi te, or the lupply of goods for a pert'.culflr

post, were 8.aaembled an.d then loeded into boats celled
for tr&nsfer to the traders in the interior.

!>!I~tteaua

The goods COMpiled

for the trade consisted of everything from English playing carda

11

to tomahawks.

Silk, gloves, broaches, and wrist bands were ex-

changed for the pelts of raccoon, mink, otter, bear, martin, red
fox, deer, and muskrat.

16

The amount of business transacted tor

any type ot tur was usually governed by the prices in the markets
of the United States and foreign countries.

This information was

regularly communicated to the traders from Mackinac or the New
York office. 17
Traders with the Company were employed in different capacities and paid not only for the skill of the task but also for
their knowledge of the Indians.

Clerks and boatmen received from

$1$0 to $200 per year.

In 1821, Gurdon Hubbard, a prominent
Chicago trader, received $12$ for his services as a clerk. 18

The

more important traders who headed an entire territory, such as
Jean Beaubien and John Cratts of Chicago, received trom $800 to
$1000 per year.

Most traders hoped for a salary since it guaran-

teed them against personal losses trom the trade.

Salaried in-

dividuals were rare, however, in the American Fur Company.
alternative methods of compensation were introduced.

Two

The tirst

ot these methods was to supply independent traders with goods at
slightly higher prices.

These traders then could sell the furs

they collected to whomever they wished.

19

Green Bay traders operated on this scheme.

For a long while, the
Finally, the traders

could share the profits and loases of the trade with the Company.
These men would either receive one-halt the profits of their out20
tit or sutfer one-half the losses.
Eventually, the Chicago

12

outfit operated on this scheme.

The American Fur Company pre-

erred its traders to work on the profit-sharing scheme since any
losses sustained would not be completely borne by the Company.
Since the trade wa. malnly conducted with the Indians. tbe_
connections of the traders with the Indian population were especiall.y

imp0I"~~_~.t.

The Chicago area was inhabited by the Fox.

Potawatomi, and Ottawa tribes.

Alexander Robinson and Billy

aldwell, who lived in the settlement at Chicago, were half-breed
Indians acceptable to both the white and Indian populations. 2l
uch ties were essential for the successful prosecution
Indian trade.

01'

the

The Green Bay region, on the other hand, was

ccupied by the Menominee and Wisconsin River Winnebago.
as a mixed village of Potawatomi and Menominee.

Milwauke

The Green Bay

traders, who controlled both these areas, had married into the
tribes.

Leading traders, Buch as ~acques Porlier and Augustin
22
rignon, had Indian wives.
Thus t~e Indians placed a good deal

l' trust In these traders and.tlleir goods.

The idyllic prosecution of the early Indian trade soon came
to an._end.

Astor brought a large capital and the harsh business

ractices of an organized company to the tur trade.
uthless in his takeover

01'

etitors in two basic ways.

a trading territory.

Astor was

He handled com-

First, the independent trader was

forced out of business by cut-throat practices, such as price
ars, or political pressures on national or local officials.
stor also offered an opposing trader employment in the American

13
Fur Company either by salary or profi t-snd-loss.

23

HWi t~._ a l_arge

cs.pit.lll" 8:n<i. extensive organization, the American Fur Company
graduall¥ ..monopoliz.e!i ,the entire trade.

CHAPTER III
THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY, 1816-1821
Astor's consolidation of the Northwest Territory for his fur
company experienced its first success within the Chicago area.
In addition to the Canadian firms whioh he had bought out, Astor
had to contend with a great number of smaller fur companies which
were looated in Detroit but supplied traders throughout the territory.1

Astor did not attempt to purchase the interests of these

companies as he did with the British companies; but, rather, he
applied competitive business operations within their territory.
In 1816, the Connant and Mack Company of Detroit controlled the
trade around the ChicaiO area.

John Crafts was their principal

agent, and his only known competition was the local trader, John
Kinzie. 2 By 1817, however, John Kinzie was employed by the
American Fur Company to provide serious competition for Crafts.
In 1817, Ramsay Crooks, who directed the American Fur Company's
operations from Mackinac, reported that John Kinzie had been very
fortunate in his trade despite ,the competition of John Crafts.
Since civilization and its
1all~ ~!ltural11

aoc:~mpanling

3

exploitation of the

caused,a depletion of animal life, tlle fur tra9.!,

was actually conducted some distance from the settlement at
Shlotio..

For this reason, the American Fur Company supplied two

outfits for the trade of this area.
~ediate

John Kinzie traded in the

neighborhood of Chicago, the Rock River territory, and

the Fox River area.

Furthermore, the American Fur Company sought

14

15
to drive competition away by establishing the Illinois outfit
which traded along the Illinois River. 4

While the Chicago outfit

was supplied by shipments of goods from Mackinac, the Illinois
outfit was dispatched from Mackinac with its supply of goods.
Antoine Deschamps, the head of the Illinois outfit, travelled
down the east side of Lake Michigan around to Chicago.

After

leaving Ohicago, the boats portaged to the Illinois River. 5

The

traders were then assigned to small posts with clearly defined
territories along the river.

The men would remain in these posts

all winter trading with the Indians and await the return of Antoin
Deschamps, who would pick up the individual traders at their posts
for the return voyage to Mackinac.
Ramsay Crooks was dissatisfied with the trade ot the Chicago
area in 1818-1819.
John Crafts.

Connant and Mack operated a post there under

In 1819, the American Fur Company transferred Jean

Beaubien from Milwaukee to Chicago to provide increased competition for John Crafts.

By 1822, Beaubien with the aid of John

Kinzie, had successfully captured the trade from John Crafts.
Rather than compete with the American Fur Company, Crafts resigned
from the Connant and Mack firm to accept employment with Astor's
company.6
Besides the competition of organized trading firms, the
American Fur Company had to contend with numerous private and
independent traders who were well-known in the territory.
Chandonnais was an independent trader in the Chicago area.

Jean
7

16
Ramsay Crooks decided to hire the man rather than compete with
him.

8

This proved an unwise decision, since by 1819 Chandonnais

had fallen into debt to the Company loudly proclaiming his Inten9
tion not to pay.
The Illinois outfit was also bothered by competing traders.
Gurdon Hubbard, a clerk with this outfit, was hindered for some
time by Antoine Bourbonais.
St. Louis.

In 1822, Bourbonais operated from

Traders from this area provided a major obstacle to

the capture of the trade by the American Fur Company.

Astor

silenced theae traders by purchasing the business of his St.
Louis rival, Cabanne, Berthold and Company.10
The American Fur Company in 1817-1818 also began to move
into the Milwaukee area.

About the time Jean Beaubien was moved

from Milwaukee to Chicago to oppose John Crafts, Solomon Juneau
was given ch~rge of the Milwaukee post.l 1 Juneau operated on a
profit-sharing scheme with the Company while James Kinzie, the
son of John Kinzie, was hired to work on a salary basis in the
12
same area.
By 1819, Juneau and Kinzie were opposed by the
private trader, Andrew J. Vieau. 13
Once Beaubien had forced Crafts out of tiuainess in Chicago,
he went back to Milwaukee to resume the trkde.'

He was then quite

surprised to find his former territory occupied by two Company
traders, Juneau and James Kinzie.

BeaUbien, disgusted with these

tactics of the Company, decided to forsake his employment with
the American Fur Company and join with other private traders to

17
force Juneau and Kinzie from the area.

Ramsay Crooks took a

rather dim view of Beaubien's intention to oppose the Company.
Crooks assured Beaubien that he could still obtain an adequate
living in the employment of the Company.

Furthermore, Crooka

warned Beaubien that "We (the Company) by no means intend to
interfere with your arrangements

80

far as you are individually

concerned, but we oertain1y will think it bad that you aasist
others to annoy ua • • • •

"14

Astor encountered different problema in expanding the American Pur Company into the Green Bay area.

Green Bay was one of the

first areas where national legislation and the American Fur Company's influence in Washington had a definite etfect on the oondu*1
of the fur trade.

The national government was forced to follow a

strict policy in Green Bay for several reasons.

First, G...n Bay

had been a comparatively large settlement since the eighteenth
oentury and had been predominately loyal to the British.Seoondly,
Green Bay had never been exposed to American inf1uenoe before the
rwar of 1812 with the typioa1 Amerioan frontier establishments
suoh as a military fort, government factory, and Indian agent.
~hird1y,
~i1ity

the Green Bay area had b.en the center of British hos-

to the United States during the War.

~ecessitated
~rea

These faotors

action by the United States government to seoure the

from British control.
As early as June 20, 181S, Governor Lewis Cas8 of the

~ichigan

Territory had recommended the establishment of military

18
posts at both Chicago and Green Bay primarily to prohibit the
flood of British traders and goods into American Territory.

He

mentioned especially that British traders brought goods to Green
Bay and then util1tized the connections with the Fox and Wisconsin

.

Rivers to distribute them throughout the territory.

15

Credence

wss added to Governor Cass's statement by General Brown, military
commander of the Northern division of Military Departments in the
United States.

General Brown commented that British influence

was so strong throughout the Northwest Territory that the only
etfective measure would be a 'wholesale exclusion of the British
from the Indian trade.

16

Governor Edwards of the Illinois terri-

tory Made strong accusations against the Green Bay traders.

In

1816, Governor Edwards said that the citizens and traders of the
Green Bay area were wholly British in sympathy; and, theretore,
he recoJ1'Ul'lended to James Monroe, Secretary of State, that these
inhabitants should be removed from the territory.

To replace the

void the exclusion of these original Green Bay inhab!.tants would
cause, Edwards recommended that

"it

~ight

be advisable • • •

to

permit their places to be supplied, by good American citizens,
for the purpose of affording accommodations to our garrison, to
our traders, and to the Indians themselves. n17
Beside. the recommendations of national and state otficials
that actions should be taken to exclude British influence trom
the Northwest Territory, a strong complaint against their
presence also came trom the American Fur Company.

To successfully
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prosecute the Indian trade, Astor had to completely eliminate
the British influence.

Because the Chicago area had been under

American influence before the War of 1812, Astor did not face
sustained British competition in that area.
Green Bay was quite different.

The situation in

The Green Bay traders for nearly a

half century had been associated with Canadian firms such as the
Southwest Company and Forsyth, Richardson and Company.

After the

War an American firm in Detroit, Stone, Bostwick and Company,
reached the territory betore Astor.

Stone hired Jacob Franks, a

British citizen, who had been the liaison man between the Green
Bay traders and the Canadian firm, the Southwest Company.

Because

their trusted friend, Jacob Franks, was employed by Stone,
Bostwick and Oompany, most of the Green 8a7 traders dealt with
18
this companr.
Because Astor could not obtain the services ot
British traders such as those at Green Bay, he also wished to see

--,

British interests excluded trom the American trade. -Ir-!stor
..
could rid himselt of the Green Bay traders, h4i

--~.-

c()~~8Jmg.J~.:1.

own

men to that area.
The recommendations ot both Astor and state ofticials led a
Oongressional committee to investigate the problem.

The Congress

acted immediately and passed a law which struck hard at the
British interests in the Indian trade:
Licenses to trade with the Indians within the territorial boundaries of the United States shall not be
granted to any but citizens ot the United States,
unless by the express direction ot the President ot
the United States, and upon such terms and conditions

20

as the public interest may in his opinion require • • • "
The law also prescribed penalties of forteiture, fine, and imprisonment for any foreigner introducing merchandise
India,!l~,country

~nto

the

or entering the Indian terri tory without a pass-

19\

port!//

Astor was not pleased with the law.

He wished to exclude

British capital from, the trade, but he did not wish to end the
possibility of his using British traders.

In other words, Astor

would have liked to sever the connection between the Gr.en Bay
traders and their former British liaison man, Jacob Franks.

In

this way, Astor thought he could better persuade the Green Bay
people to join his firm.

In a letter to James Monroe, Secretary

of State, Astor said that he could not operate a successtul fur
business without the aid ot Canadian traders since United States
citizens had neither the stamina nor the skill to become effective
traders.

Therefore, Astor asked that he be allowed to issue

licenses at his own discretion.

20

Even betore Astor's letter was

received, the President decided that the power to grant licenses
should be vested in the Governor ot the Michigan Territory and the
agents for Indian affairs at Michilimackinac, Green Bay, and
21
Chicago.
This directive benefited the American Fur Company.
Now the power to grant licenses rested with people in the actual
trading areas where Astor's agents could exert an extraordinary
amount of pressure upon local officials to obtain licenses for
specific British traders.

21

Tho law of 1816 was immediately revised.

The United Statel

government did not follow the harsh recommendations of Hinian
Edw&rds and General Brown who had suggested the total exclusion pf
foreigners fram the territory.

Instead, the government followe,

Ast,:>r's view of the value of British participation in the trade
as evidenced by the following official statement by William H.
Crawford; Secretary of War:
It is therefore wholly improbable that the
enterprise of American citizens will furnish an
adequate supply to those remote tribes. The want
of capital in the hands of men accustomed to the
trade, and who have enterprise to bear the fatigues,
and brave the dangers incident to its prosecution
will it is believed render it necessary for the
present to permit foreigners to carryon this trade
under such regulations as shall subject them to a
22
strict observance of the laws of the United States.
Therefore, the law of 1816 prohibiting foreigners from the
trade was relaxed under proper regulation.

New regulations re-

quired an applicant for a trading license, whether he was a
British or American citiZen, to be of trustworthy character
(decided by the Indian agent) and to give a bond equal to onefourth the capital employed. 2 )
Although the American Fur Company was friendly with many 01
the local officials charged with dispensing lioens8s,24 it was
at odds with )lajor William H. Puthuff, agent for Indian affairs
at Michilimackinac, and Colonel John Bowyer, agent for Indian
afrs.irs at Green Bay.

Neither of these men appeared to have bet n

prejudiced for or against the American Fur Company, yet they wele

·.
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staunchly opposed to any admission of British traders.

Major

Puthuf£ thought that all British traders had a political aim
• • • to alienate the Indians from the American government and

people, to attach them to the British interests by every and by
any of the most insidious means."

25

Because of this opinion,

Puthuft oonsidered the traders ot the Green Bay region, especially
the Grignon brothers, the most dangerous to national unity. 26
Perhaps Major Puthutt was overzealous in his desire to protect American interests, yet there was reason tor him to be suapicious ot the Green Bay residents.

As mentioned previously,

Green Bay was hostile to the United States during the War.

Ot

the residents at tho Bay, there were only two American oitizens.
In addition, the Grignon brothers, John Lawe, and Jacques Porlier
held commissions in the British army.27

Puthutt could not imagine

such people returning to a peaoetul pursuit of the trade atter the
War.
Puthuff, theretore, strictly entorced the law ot 1816.

In

June, 1816, he seized the furs of Jaoques Porlier, a resident ot
Green Bay, which were enroute to Canada in payment for goods he
had reoeived from a Canadian firm.

Puthutf based his seizure

upon the fact that Porlier had no lioense to trade in the terri*
tory.

28

Puthuft worked an unrair hardship on many traders.

ae-

tween the time the law of 1816 was promulgated, April 29, 1816,
and the time of the seizure of Porlier's goods, Porlier would have
had a difficult time obtaining a license.

In 1818, Porlier was

23
fo~ced

to write his employer, Forsyth, Richardson and Company,

that he could not possibly pay his debts since his goods hed been
confiscated for the past several years.

Puthutt's harsh tactics

had created hostility between the frontier citizens and their new
~overnment.

Parlier remarked that "I begin to perceive that that

word liberty in the language ot politics or ot the government doea
not mean the same thing as we oommonly suppose.R 29
Atter Puthutt'a initial harsh policy with regard to the
issuing of licenses, Governor Cass was forced to instruct him on
the real purpose at the law.

Governor Cass pointed out that

merely because a person was a foreigner did not exolude him from
the trade.

Governor Cass commented that the real question was

" • _ • whether the person applying for a license be one who can
30
be safely admitted to trade in the Indian oountry."
On May

4,

1817, Governor Cass received word trom George

Graham, Acting Secretary of War, that John Astor had embarked on
an American enterprise, the Amerioan Fur Company, which should be
granted every possible aid. 3l Governor Cass dealt with the
American Fur Company quite tairly_

For example, in the question

at licensest he did not act partisanly toward the American Pur
Company as some authors charge. 32 Cass did act harshly against
British capital in the fur trade, but he extended every possible
favor to American companies irregardless at whether Astor held a
oontrolling influence.

When the Green Bay traders were employed

by the American firm of Stone, Bostwick and Company, Cass found it

24
necessary to once again write Major Puthutt warning him that
strict application of the law was not always the best polioy_
Cass expressed the desire that Puthutt should lioense the men
requested by Stone, Bostwick and Company_

He realized that the

majority ot these men were still British citizens, but he was
also aware that they were supported by American capital.
tore, Cass telt that

M

• •

There-

• when American capital and enterprise

are embarked in this trade • • • to enoourage it by all proper
means. n33
Governor Cass's lenient polioy in respect to lioenses tor
all American tur companies was detrimental to the monopolistio
designs ot the Amerioan Fur Company.

When licenses were .ifticult

to obtain, Astor had enough national and local intluence to
attract traders trom other oompaniea by promising them lioenses.
The new policy ot lenien07 was also reflected in Major Puthutf'a
attitude toward the Green Bay people.

ae wrote to Indian agent

Bowyer at Green Bay in September, 1817, concerning a license for
John Lawe.

Although Puthutf dialiked the Green Bay traders, he

instructed Bowyer to iasue a licenae to John Lawe if his oonduct
and deportment were goOd. 34

Colonel Bowyer, although he would

have preferred to keep lioenses trom Lawe and the Grignons, consented to the new interpretation of the law.
lioense numerous traders.

Be prooeeded to

Bowyer'a lenienoy prompted Louia

Grignon to remark that " • • • I believe there will be as many
traders as Houses. n35
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In January, 1818, the United States again changed the policy
in regard to licensing ot British sUbjects.

This further change

added to the confusion on the frontier and increased the hostility
of the Green Bay traders toward the national government.

Cass

wrote to John BOV7er that the President had again decided to completely eliminate foreigners from obtaining licenaes as traders
or even from being employed as mere clerks under the watchful eye
of an American citizen. 36 Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart immediately raised a furor over the new policy.

They pointed out to

John Astor that the majorit1 of their traders were British citizens; and, without their services, the American Fur Company would
be ruined.

Crooks and Stuart asked Astor to present their case

directly to the president,37
American policy was again changed within the short space of
three months because of the influence ot Stusrt, Crooks, and Astor
upon the government.

On April 2),

1818, Lewis Cass wrote to

~e

Indian agents at Green Bay and Chicago informing them that not all
foreigners need be excluded.

Cass's explanation of this change

sounded as if John Astor had written the letter,

The inconven-

ience which American capital would sufter without the aid of the
toreigner's superior knowledge ot the trade, Cass explained, made
necessary certain exceptions to the law.

Cass explained that the

United States policymakers had made one unchangeable decision;
no longer would toreigners be allowed to head a trading outtit or
have charge ot a group ot men within the territory.

The new law

26
only allowed foreigners to enter the territory mlder the direction
of an American citizen as boatmen and interpreters.

Theso rogu-

lations required a list of all traders entering a territory to be
submitted to proper authorities, plus banda, not only for the
complete

out~it

trader.

The law also looked forward to the time when all for-

but also an additional $$00 bond for each foreign

eigners could be excluded.

It required that for every foreign

trader hired as an interpreter, an American citizen also had to
38
be employed to learn the duties of an interpreter.
Even though the law was more lenient, it still worked hardships on the Green Bay traders.

In 1818, John Lawe claimed that

he was cloae to financial ruin.

Jacob Franks, the agent for

Stone, Bostwick and Company dealing with the Green Bay traders,
suggested that John Lawe arrange his trade in accordance with
the regulations.

John Lawe could hire Americans to transport his

goods to the interior, Franks thought, while Lawe himself acted
as interpreter even though he was really head of the outfit.
Franks, however, warned Lawe that he should apply for citizenship
as soon as possible. 39 He further urged John Lawe to form a
partnership with Jacques Porlier and the Grignon brothers to
minimize their 10sses. 40
Frank's advice did not tmmediately impress itselt upon John
Lawe.

In November, 1818, Lawe wrote to Thomas G. Anderson, an

old British comrade during the War.

Lawe claimed that since the

War he had lost nearly $800 on his property alone.

Furthermore,

27

he had failed to obtain a license ror the coming season and
commented that "I wish I could sellout and leave this country
forever. n41
John Lawe and the other Green Bay traders had not made such
threats orrhandedly.

In 1819, Lawe received a letter from Robert

Dickson, another British army orficer, who requested him to delay
his move to Canada until other arrangements could be made. 42
Dickson wished Lawe and his fellow Bay inhabitants to move to the
Red River district where Lord Selkirk had purchased lands with
the aid of the Hudson Bay Company to begin a settlement. 43
Lawe and the Grignons were never able to act on this scheme aince
Lord Selkirk died the following year.
With the death of Selkirk, Lawe and the other Bay traders
decided to act upon the advice

or

Jacob Franks.

They attempted

to engage in the trade according to American regulations.

In

the early part of 1819, John Lawe procured a license to enter the
territory as an interpreter.

Governor Cass was quite willing to

grant the lioense but the final deoision was up to Colonel Bowyer,
the Indian agent at Green Bay.

Cass influenced Bowyer's decision

somewhat by reminding him that merely because Lawe was still a
British citizen did not exclude him from the trade. 44

Finally,

the Green Bay traders recognized that the only way to realize a
successful trade in their area was to become citizens of the
United States.

Therefore, late in 1819, John Lawe, Pierre,

Augustin, and Charles Grignon applied tor citizenship at

28

Michilimackinac. 45
The efforts of the

Gree~

Bay residents to obtain American

citizenship were frustrated by the changing stipulations of the
original Jay Treaty.

Jacques Porlier, a prominent trader ot the

Green Bay region, had been granted tentative citizenship as were
other traders.

On September j, 1819, however, the Attorney Gen-

eral ot the United States prescribed more stringent regulations
for attaining citizenship.

The Attorney General did not teel

that mere residence in the territory constituted citizenship.
The laws governing citizenship under the Jay Treaty, the Attorney
General s8id, required a person to swear an oath betore a delegated otflcial. 46

Governor Cass, therefore, wes required to

suspend the citiZenship of. the Green Bay residents until the
proper oath could be administered. 47
This action was partially due to the influence of the American Fur Company.

Before 1820, the Green Hay traders were still

dealing with Stone, Bostwick and Company, a leading competitor
of Astor in the territory.

The Green Bay traders had resisted

all the efforts of Astor's enterprise to gain their services.

In

1818, Ramsay Crooks personally Journeyed to Green Bay to persuade
them to enter the American Fur Company.

All the Bay traders, how-

ever. remained loyal to Jacob Franks and Stone, Bostwick and
Company.4 8

Crooks and Stuart, seeing that their initial efforts

to eliminate competition in the area had failed, decided to undertake a different policy.

In 1819, they successfully cajoled

~--------------------------------------~
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fovernment otticials into suspending the tentative citizenship of
the Green Bay traders. 49

Now Crooks' and Stuart temporarily

possessed without competition all the trading territories on the
Fox and Wisconsin Rivers.
Stuart realized that soon the government would be required
to grant citizenship to the Green Bay residents.

Therefore, he

decided to act as a friend ot the Green Bay people and help them
gain their citizenship.

On October 28, 1819, Stuart expressed

his concern over the revocation of their citizenship, but he
mentioned that Mr. Ramsay Crooks was in Washington attempting to
secure citizenship for them.

50

The Green Bay residents were

tooled by Stuart's clever scheme and now agreed to deal with the
Company.

Robert Stuart then used his intluence to gain citizen-

ship and justice for the new employees.

Writing to Governor

Lewis Cass on Hovember 3. 1819, Stuart told him of the injust
action of Indian agent Bowyer at Green Bay.

BOW1er, who had

granted licenses to Porlier, Lawe, and Pierre Grignon tor the
coming year, had now decided to revoke them.

Stuart explained

that the traders, under the impression that they possessed
licenses. had contracted tor trade goods and now taced tinancial
ruin.

In conclusion, Stuart urged Governor Cass that

A

• • •

such oppression and inconsistency will I am convinced be speedily
remedied by you Sir. A51
In the interim, the Green Bay traders Skilltully avoided
the full letter of the law.

John Lawe hired a Mr. Laurance, an

30

~merican citizen to do his trading in the interior. 52 Ramsay
Crooks wrote to Louis Rouse, another Green Bay trader, that
hiring Americans to act as tronts was a dangerous policy.

Crooks

did not suggest abandoning this policy, but he did warn the
traders to exercise extreme caution.

53

In October and November of 1821, the Green Bay traders
finally received notification ot their status as citizens of the
United States. 54

Even though the Green Bay residents were even-

tually confirmed as citizens, the results of the license and
citizenship controversy seemed to have created outright hostility
on the trontier.

The unsettled and inconsistent policy ot the

United States government toward British subjects and the Indian
trade had eventually brought it temporary control of this frontier
enterprise.

However, the loyalty of men continually abused by a

strange government .was certainly to be just as inconsistent.
The American Fur Company benefited from the vaoillations of
the government.

Beoause the Amerioan Fur Company possessed.

great deal ot influence in Washington .and on the frontier, it
could otfer its traders advantages not found elsewhere.
Eventually men sUQh 'as Colonel Bowyer and Major Puthutf who
opposed the Company were removed from their posts to be replaoed
by more pliant s,rvants. 55

By helping to obtain licenses tor the

Green Bay traders, the American Fur Company eliminated an

Amer~

foan competitor, Stone, Bostwick and Company, from the Green Bay
area.

Thus, by 1821, the Amerioan Fur Company had driven Connant
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/

and Mack from Chicago, had established a post at Green Bay, and

had gained the services of Lawe and his tellow traders.

The

inconsistent policy ot the government had driven some British
companies out of the territory.

In place ot the British, the

government had helped to create the monopolistic control and
enormous national power ot the American Fur Oompany_

c

CHAPTER IV

.~,I'

.;-

THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY AND THE
GOVERNMENT FACTORY SYSTEM, 1816-1822
From 1816-1822, in both Chicago and Green

B~y,

the organized

fur trade under the auspices of the American Fur Company and the
private traders was faced with an a1arminp threat to its security.
The re-establishment of the factory system after the War ot 1812
was designed to rid the area of British influence as well as to
assure the Indians a decent existence from the fur trade.

The

factory intended to give the Indians a fair price for their furs,
and thus it was a competitive institution with the regular frontier trader.
Matthew Irwin was appointed

g~vernment

with a salary of $1000 per year.

tactor at Green Bay

At Chicago, Jacob Varnum was

the factor with a salary of only $800 per year.

1

The differenoe

in salary between the two factories most likely resulted from the
more difficult task whioh faced Irwin at Green Bay.

While Chicago

had been the site of a faotory before the War., GX'een Bay was still
a comparatively untamed area without the influence of American
frontier institutions.
Thomas L. McKenney, Superintendent of the Indian Trade and
head of the factory system, was optimistio about the prospects of
the re-established factory system.

In 181$, the total amount of

goods sent to Green Bay amounted to $15,7.38.06 while Chioago recelved a shipment of $9,452 • .34.

2

.32

MoKenneyls hopes for a suooess-
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rul factory at Green Bay were quickl,. dissolved.

By 1811, he

appeared dissatisfied with the business of the Green Ba,. factor,.:
Since you have been at Green Bay your returns have
been ver,. much irregular and the business you have
been doing, very limited. The whole amount of
your sales appears to be only $538.40 and of this
sum it would 8eem about $180 had been sold to the
Indians. J
Disillu.sioned by the operation of the Green Bay ractory,
McKenney asked Irwin whether or not the business .eld any good
prospects for the future.

If the factor,. could not maintain a

favorable trade, McKenney said, it should be closed immediately.4
In March, 1811, Irwin explained the reasons tor the poor business
done at the factory.

The admission ot British citizens who had

for man,. years traded in this area, Irwin claimed, robbed the
factory or the Indian trade.

Irwin accused the traders of in-

citing the hostility ot the Indians against the factory.5
The failure of the tactory was caused by many tactors.

In

September, 1811, Irwin again wrote to Thomas L. McKenney and
placed primary responsibility for the failure ot the factory upon
the Indian policy or the national government.

Irwin found an

incongruity in the system ot the Indian agents and government
factors for
• • • the factors are sent to supply the wants of
the Indians, and the Indian agents can adopt such
measures as to deteat all their plans to that end.
It i8 very certain that the authority vested in
them to issue lioenses is well calculated to d~e~~~
all the benetits ~at might be expected tr
,b.eTOWE:factories • • • •
~~
~~
"V
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Many times the Indian agents were friendly to the traders
7
and fur companies and thus directly untriendly to the tactor.
In addition, Irvin was not merely compl.aining about British
traders being licensed but any traders in the territory.

The

only eftective remedy tor the Green Bay tactory, Irvin claimed,
was an absolute prohibition ot trading licenses to all traders
when the tactory could supply the good. needed by a particular
8
Indian settlement.
The inetfectiveness ot Irwin's business at the tactory was
readily apparent in his

1817.

qu~rterly

returns tor May to August ot

In this period, Irwin collected turs valued at $)04.76.

At the same time, Irwin sold mprchandise valued at $1,349.08.
There was a detinite discrepancy in Irvin'S accounts.
only exchanged merchandise tor turs ot approximately

9

It he had
~e

same

value, then the two figures should have been relatively equal.
McKenney realized the discrepancies in the quarterly account.

He

sur.miaed that Irwin was selling goods directly to the white
traders instead ot merely conducting a tur trade exchange tor the
Indiana.

The factory had det1n1ter·pules governing cash or credit

sales to whites.

The f •• tor could only sell goods to white

aettlers when the gooda were not
~ven

req~ir.d

tor the Indians.

10

in this caae, nevertheless, the factor was supposed to dis-

courage such transactions by charging the white settlers prices
ten per cont above the standard.
these rules.

Matthew Irwin did not tollow

In one case, be sold gunpowder at 65¢ per pound, a
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price far below the minimum cost to the factory.

McKenney ex-

pressed his dissatisfaction with Irwin's unsound business practices.

A trader or white settler, McKenney said, would buy the

powder at

65~

per pound; and, then, he would proceed to the Indian
11
territory to sell the powder for $1.00 per pound.
Thus, Irwin

had defeated the aims of the factory system in two ways.

Firat,

he made it impossible for the factory to operate within a specified budget.

More important, Irwin sustained and encouraged

traders to cheat the Indians, the very practice which the factory
attempted to prohibit.
Because of McKenney's complaints, Mat,thew Irvin decided upon
a scheme to increase the effectiveness of the factory.

Irwin

felt that his major tasks were to gain the confidence of the
Indians and to subsidize their trade before the private traders
could.

He decided to operate like the American Fur Company by

dispatching agents for the factory (sub-factors) into the interior
According to Irwin, the factory was located too far away from the
actual trading areas to gain the Indian's business.

Previous to

Irwin's plan, the private traders had the advantage of selling
goods to the Indians and collecting their furs before the factory
could exert any influence.

McKenney was skeptical of the whole

idea and demanded that Irwin obtain sufficient security betore
dispensing goods to a factory agent.

12

The reaction of the Green Bay traders was most certainly
hostile since Irwin had entered into their trading territories.
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In 1821, Louis Grignon, who was trading on the Fox and Wisconsin
Rivers, mentioned that there was increased oompetition because ot
the men sent trom the factory.

In a rather poignant statement,

Grignon commented that " • • • for the people paid by the government, aocording to my thought should not try to win one or
another individual just in order to make a profit under the oover
of care tor the savagea and ot the pretended benetits that the,
reoeive trom the factories • • • • n1 3
Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart ot the American Pur Company
found this policy particularly odious.

According to Crooks and

Stuart, Matthew Irwin had perverted the original intention at the
factory system.

'!'he man sent by the .t'ac,tory into the interior,

Crooks claimed, acted just like a normal trader and attempted to
make a profit.

Because ot Irwin's plan, Crooks asserted, the

factory was no longer a benevolent aid to unfortunate Indians,
but it was now a government business participating in the fur
trade.

Crooks, therefore, conCluded that the government had en-

tered into the field of private enterprise, and, because ot ita
power, was not operating on equal grounds with the local traders.
Therefore, Crooks

~nd

Stuart encouraged John Astor to speak to the

President with the intention of gaining the abolition of the
factory system or the reversal of Irwin's system of subwfactors.~
There was another side to this controversy besides that ot
the American Fur Compahy on the practices of the tactory sTat.-.
Since the inauguration of the factory, Major Irwin had complained
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about British influence in the trade.

Irwin felt the contradic-

tion of American governmental policy.

Although laws had been

passed to reduce British influence in the trade, Irwin stated
that this was only a partial answer.

The American Fur Company,

he stated, had been considered an American firm by the government
when, in actual tact, it was run by British citizens.

1S

To

Irwin, the license law was inettective because it was not pri marily aimed at the traders of the American Fur Company.

Irwin

realized that the American Fur Company and the tactory were two
competing organizations.
The American Fur Company tound the tactory a tiresome
nuisance to its attempt to gain a monopoly of the tur trade.

They

deliberately reduced the price of their goods to undersell the
16
tactory.
Yet the Company held an even more lmportant advantage
over the factory--polltical control.

Both Major Puthutt at

Mackinac and Colonel Bowyer at Green Bay, who had refused to
accede to the Company's demands tor 11censes, were eventually removed trom ottlce under the requests ot Robert Stuart and Ramsay
Crooks.

Crooks held such influenoe with Lewis Cass that, even

though he was a Brltish citizen, he was commi8sioned to journey to
Prairie du Chien to- examine the conduct ot the Indian agent at
that place.

17 Through the reports ot his factors, McKenney vas

aware of the tactios ot Astorts 'irm.

MoKenneyts strongest oom-

plaint was against the practice ot the Company hiring all the
traders in a particular area, whether needed or not, merely to
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keep the factory from obtaining needed manpower for duties such
18
as interpreters and clerks.
In 1820, Irwin felt he had definite proof concerning the
hostile intentions and influence of the British traders employed
or connected with the American Fur Company.

Irwin said that a

Mr. Armitinger, an independent trader, went to the neighborhood
of Lake Winnebago and was fired upon by the Indians.

The same

incident occurred when Captain Whistler from Fort Howard entered
the area.

Yet when Jacques Porlier and Louis Grignon, employees

of the American Fur Company, approached this area, they were unmolested and reaped a large amount of furs from the Indians.

In

sum, Irwin felt that these facts proved the hostility which the
British traders and the American Fur Company were erecting be19
tween the American and Indian population.
Jacob Varnum in Chicago also complained of British traders
disrupting his trade.
at Chicago.

Varnum encountered a difterent situation

For the first two years, 1816-1818, the Chicago fac-

tory experienced a limited degree ot success.

Early in 1817,

McKenney recommended that Jacob Varnum receive a raise in salary
because ot the increase in the volume of trade at the Chicago
factory.

20
Varnum's salary was raised trom $800 to $1000 per year.

From the inception of the Chicago tactory in 1816 to March 31,
1818, the factory gained $2253 in the trade.

The expense of

running the establishment, however, amounted to $4093.

Despite a

total loss ot $2000, the Chicago factory was more successful than

39
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the faotory at Green Bay.
There are several explanations for the greater suocess of the
Chicago factory.

The most probable reason was the influence which

the Chicago factory exerted before the War of 1812.

The Indians

had faith in the Chicago factory while the independent traders
were still disorganized due to the War.

The Chicago factory,

from 1816-1818, provided the only outlet for furs and the purchase
of merohandise.

By 1818, however, the American Fur Company pur-

sued the fur trade in the area.

It had forced John Crafts out of

businesl, and certainly the Chicago factory must have begun to
teel the oompetition of the Ameridan Pur Company.
In December, 1818, Jaoob Varnum,

8S

Matthew Irwin had done,

previously, remonstrated against the large nwpbers of traders infiltrating into the Chicago area.

Varnum said that

The indiscriminate admission ot British subjects
to trade with the Indians, is a matter ot pretty
general complaint throughout this seotion of the
country_ There are tive establishments within
limits of this agenoy headed by British subjects. 22
These establishments, to which Varnum referred, most likely were
the American Fur Company's posts along the Illinois River headed
by Antoine Deschamps and the Chicago headquarters under Jean
Beaubien.
The factories both at Chicago and Green Bay, however, reo~ived

their staunchest opposition not so much from the British

traders themselves as from the goods they traded.

The private

trader effectively distributed whiskey to the Indians, and in this
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lay one of the chief causes for the poor business of the factories
Liquor sales to the Indians had been a problem on the earliest
frontiers of America.
~uthorizing

In 1802, the Congress had passed a law

the President to take such measures as appeared

proper" • • • to prevent or restrain the vending or distribution
of spiritou8 liquors among all or any of the Indian tribes."23
Yet this law did not actually prevent the use of liquor.

In 1816,

Governor Ninian Edwards of the Illinois Territory attempted to
rectify the situation by obtaining passage
which forbade the sale

or

a territorial law

or

liquor to the Indians and provided
penalties for such action. 24 lbe Green Bay traders were promptly
informed of the new law and the penalties attached.

25

Yet they

found the law both impractical and impossible for officials to
enforce:
You will notice, Sir, that liquor having once been
allowed among the savages it is not possible to
restrain them from it, and that moreover there is 26
not force enough here to sustain such a regulation.
Knowing that the law would be impossible to enforce, the
traders carefully avoided the spirit of the law.

The law only

forbade the sale of liquor to the Indians so that the traders,
before going into the territory, would claim that any liquor in
their packs was merely for private use. 27 The law did not ban
liquor from the Indian lands, and thus a large quantity was
always kept by the traders themselves and at their depot at Green
Bay.

John Bowyer, the Indian aFent at Green Bay, attempted to
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ban the, storing of liquor at Green Bay, but Governor Cass intormed
him that such action, although desirable, would be illegal.

28

Many times Irvin complained bitterly of the use of liquor in
the Indian trade which induced the Indians to become intoxicated
and to sell their furs at poor prices.

Irwin explained why it

was impossible to prosecute traders for selling liquor illegally
to the Indians:
A return to reason vill induce many ot them (the
Indians) to mention vho sold them the whiskey •.
but it is deemed illegal to accept Indian testimony, so that the British and American traders • • •
may deal in w~9skey without the smallest chance
of detection.
Although the American Fur Company vas not in full control of
the territory betore 1822, it was involved in the whiskey trade.
In actual fact, the American Fur Company would have preferred not
to deal in liquor.
trading outtit.

Liquor was an expensive oommodity tor a

In addition, liquor destroyed the Indian's de-

sire and ability to hunt.

These oonsiderations have led 80me

authors to surmise that the Amerioan Fur Company retrained trom
the use of whiskey in the trade betore 1822. 30 In the Company'.
Account Book. for 1821, however, the following items were shipped
to Green Bay and Chicago:

418 gallons of High Wine, 30 gallons

or Jamaioa Spirits, 8 gallons ot Cognac Brandy, and 35 gallons or
Rio Wine.

31

A more damaging example ot the American Fur Company'. conneotion with the whiskey trade ocourred in 1821.

At this time, Dr.

42
Alexander Wolcott, the Chicago Indian agent, refused to grant
James Kinzie a trading license for the Milwaukee area.

Wolcott

was informed by Matthew Irwin that Kinzie was suspected of having
sold liquor to the Iridians. 32 Irwin had probably told Wolcott ot
the incident so that Kinzie could not obtain a trading licen.e
for the Chicago area.

Ram.ay Crook., with whom Kinzie was em-

ployed, detested the actions ot Indian agent Wolcott.

Wolcott,

Crooks said, refused to grant Jame. Kinzie a licen.e on mere
suspicion.

To correct such an injustioe to his agent, Crooks

obtained a lioense for Kinzie trom Colonel Boyd at Mackinac.

Yet

Crooks warned Kinzie that his oonduct now had to be above reproach. 33 Crooks's ability to obtain a license fram Colonel Boyd,
despite the objections of Wolcott and Irwin, was typical ot the
enormous power of the American Fur Company.

Colonel

Bo~,

who

issued the license to Kinzie, had been Crooks's choice tor Indian
agent to replace the recalcitrant Major Puthutf.

In 1818, Gov-

ernor Cas8, realizing the problems caused by an agent licensing a
trader in Mackinac tor trade in the Chicago area, had outlawed
such procedures without the con.ent ot both agents concerned. 34
Despite the action of Boyd, then, Wolcott ordered Kinzie to olose
his trading outfit within sixty days and leave the territory.
Irwin realized that the absence of Kinzie trom the Milwaukee are.
would leave the Indians without a trader, and he was more than
happy to enter this country controlled by the American Fur Company
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Irwin, therefore, oommissioned Jacques Vieau as an agent of the
Green Bay factory.

Vieau was an American citizen; and, aocording

to Irwin, he was of impeccable character.

Irwin gave him goods

amounting to $2,228.25 with which to deal with the Indians. 35
McKenney, the Superintendent of the Indian Trade, did not
allow this inoident concerning Kinzie to go unnoticed.

On Deo-

ember 7, 1821, he strongly oriticized the Amerioan Fur Company in
the Daily National Intelligencer with the oase of James Kinzie as
an example.

The people now knew, he aaid, the identity of

n

.,

• these invisible nobodies • • • dealers in whiskey. furs, and
Indian blood • • • agents of this same American Fur Company,ft36
Crooks and Stuart were hardly pleased over the Kinzie affair,
In 1821, Stuart accused Irwin of exaggerating the case against
Kinzie in

ord~r

to improve the national image ot his factory.

Stuart predicted that, despite Irwin'S attempts, the factory
system would be abolished within a year. 37

By 1822, Stuart had

changed the tone of his critioism because of the public reaction
to the Kinzie affair.

Now he found Kinzie a less than reputable

character and considered relieving him ot his position with the
Company. 38

Finally, in April, 1822, Stuart told Kinzie to leave
the Milwaukee area to another trader and return to Chicago. 39
Stuart then attempted to aave the name of the American Fur

Company by completely disclaiming any knowledge ot Kinzie's
activities.

Stuart quite bluntly told Governor Cass that • • • •

whenever any person either employed by, or having dealing8 ot
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wha te'~rer ns ture with us does not conform to the laws • • • governing the trade • • • we will always be willing and happy to
have them entirely excluded from the country."

Stuart actually

suggested that Kinzie be e%pelled from the territory.

The only

reason the Oompany had been reluctant to act, Stuart explained,
was because James Kinzie was the son or John Kinzie, an inportant
trader of the Chicago area.

40 Whether or not the American Pur

Company was aware of Kinzie's activities in selling

liquo~

to the

Indians can not be definitely proven, but the large shipments or
liquor made by the Company throughout the period indicate that the
Company made use of liquor whenever needed.
James Kinzie ignored the actions of Dr. Wolcott and the
advice of Robert Stuart and remained in the Milwaukee area.

As
41
late as July, 1822, Kinzie va. peddling liquor to the Indians.
To prevent his continuing illegal conduct, Alexander Wolcott vrote
to George Boyd, the Indian agent at Mackinac, to inform him of
Kinzie's activities.

Wolcott warned Boyd against issuing Kinzie

e license for the coming year.

Finally, Wolcott sent a marshal
to apprehend Kinzie and make an example or his illegal conduct. 42
Tpe real erfect of Kinzie's activities and those of many

unscrupulous traders in the peddling of whiskey were clearly
evident in the Congressional investigation and the eventual report of Reverend Jedidiah Morse.

In 1818, the House of Represen-

tatives had requested Secretary of War Calhoun to report

OIl

feasibility of instituting a new plan for the conduet of the

the

45
Indian trade.

Calhoun immediately wrote to the men connected. with

the system inviting them to oomment on the best method ot abolishing the ourrent system and instituting a new organization.
T. L. MoKenney was the tirst.to reply to Calhoun's inquiries.

In

MoKenney's opinion, the abolishing ot the tactories oould only
bring harm to the Indians at the expense ot aiding individual
enterprise. 43

Levis Cass,on the other hand, was decidedly in

favor of a new system tor the Indian trade.

Sinoe Amerioan

private enterprise was now capable ot conduoting the Indian trade,
Cass claimed, the government should wlthdraw.

Cass's only

rec~

mend.tion was to erect stringent trade laws against liquor which
then would place the trader. and the Indians on equal footing in
the conduct of the trade. 44

Calhoun's Report, issued in 1818,

called for the abolition of the !actories.

In their place,

Calhoun envisioned stringent

government~

regulations over the

conduct of private traders.

He suggested that licenses should cos

from $100 to $500, thereby limiting the number of traders in the
area.

In addition, the traders were to be oonfined to designated

locations.

All such regulations were intended to insure the gov-

ernment's supervision over the conduct of the trade. 45

These

reoommendations were not immediately accepted.
Realizing that Congress was g.adualll moving to the abolishing of the factories unless they improved, McKennel instituted
several measures to halt the financial losses.

He !irst intro-

46
duced a doublecheck accounting system tor the factory.

Betore any

bills or accounts could be sent to the central ottice in Georgetown, they had to be cleared by Governor Cass, the Superintendent

ot Indian attairs tor the area. 46

In this way, McKenney hoped to

insure the correctness ot all accounts by an area supervisor.
McKenney also prohibited the aale of furs at the tactory, requiring instead that all turs had to be sent to the central
otfice. 47

This regulation enabled McKenney to exerci.e personal

supervision over the sale of furs.
Opposition grew against the tactories with the publication of
the Reverend Jedidiah Morsets Report.

Morse had been dispatched

by the Committee on Indian Aftairs to investigate the factories.
Interviewing Matthew Irwin, Morse discovered that the Green Bay
factory conducted the majority of its buainess with the white
tr.ders and the military personnel at Port Howard.

Annual trade

with the Indiana did not exceed $1600, Irwin estimated, while
trade with Port Howard and people ot mixed blood accounted tor
'$,$00.

Irwin placed primary blame tor the failure of his tactory

upon the large number ot traders in the territory, thus causing
him to sell to white inhabitants.

48 Turning to Chicago, Morse

found that Varnum, tor the past year, had traded for rurs amounting to only $2$.

Although recognizing the intluence or whiskey

upon the trade, Morse said the Indians were not actually maltreated by the trader.

The Indians dealt with the private traders

because they wanted to and "it is evident, that by some means,

47
the Indians have not confidence in the government, as fair and
upright in their trade.- 49

Morse found several reasons for the

distrust of the factory by the Indians;

the inferior quality of

its goods, prior influence of British traders, and the harmtul
effects ot whiskey.

Morse thought that the principal aim of the

factory system, the civilisation of the Indians, had been a total
failure.

Rather than advance the Indians, the factory kept them

in the hunter stsge of civilization by inoreasing their dependenoe on the fur trade. 50
In 1821, the Committee on Indian Attairs in the Senate, held
tinal bearings before abolishing the factory.

Irwin again

aocused the American Fur Company of ruining the tac tory.

lie

stated that his sub-factor, Louis Rouss, was dispatched to the
interior where Crooks deliberately sent three men to oppose him.
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Crooks refuted such accusations by again illustrating that the
supplying of private traders was against the purpose ot the factory.

He claim.ed that Irwin supplied Rouse the goods totaling

$3000

and that Rouse, in order to derive a profit, 80ld the goods

at prices higher than required by the factory.

$2

John Biddle, the new Indian agent at Green BaY'. presented
testim.ony whichr:shnwed a definite hostility to the factory aystem.
Biddle stated that tlie goods supplied the rae tory were interior
in qualIty to those of private traders.

Further, he claimed that

Irwin had not only supplied large amounts ot goods to sub-factors

48
but also sold goods to private traders on credit.

In sum, tactors

such as Varnum and Irwin had overstated their case against the
British, Biddle explained, and had failed to realize the inadequacy ot their own goods,

The tactory was of no use to the

frontier community, Biddle said; and its end vould be a blessing
to the Indians,53
McKenney vas forced to initiate action tor the closing ot
the Green Bay and Chicago factories betore Congressional action.
He retused, nevertheless, to acquiesce in the reasons advanced by
Congress tor such action.

The factories were not ineftective

because of inadequacy of goods or Indian hostility, McKenney
claimed,

Their demise vas the result ot

u

•

• • unsuitable

provisions,which exist for the regulation of the trade.

Hordes

ot private adventurers, availing themselves of the looseness of
the system, have crowded into those parts on account ot the superiority of the furs which are taken • • • "54

McKenney felt that

the closing ot the tactories vould cause the alienation ot the
Indian from the vhite settlements and eventually bring bloodshed.
He vas forced, hovever, to instruct Varnum and Irvin to begin
closing their affair.,55
As CongreSSional action neared for the closing ot the factori •• , the most outspoken protagonist in Congress was Thomas
Hart Benton.

Benton wielded consid.rable influence since he vas

both an inhabitant ot a frontier state and a ranking member ot the
Senate Committe. on Indian Arfairs. 56 Because ot his connection

with Ramsay Crooks of the American Fur Company, some authors have
claimed that Benton was extremely prejudiced against the factories. 57

Such accusations do not seem warranted, however, be-

cause Benton could have become an enormously rich man through
these supposed connections. 58

Benton, nevertheless made several

mistakes in his zeal to rid the frontier of the factory.

In his

many lengthy polemics against the system in the Senate, Benton
constantly claimed that inferior goods were purehased tor the
trade.

Bis major objection was against eight gross ot Jew's

harp. which he ridiculed as totally unsuitable to tbe Indian
trade. 59

Such objects were extremely popular with the Indians,
60
McKenney retorted; and thus suitable to the trade.
McKenney
also pointed out that the stocking ot interior goods could not be
avoided.

Such goods were purchased in large quantIties after the

War, he claimed, when goods were ot poor QUallty.6l
position .eemed tairly

accur~e.

McKenney'.

In 1815, J. Mason, then head ot

the factory system, had admitted that the goods .elected for the
trade were inferior because shortages of all products were
62
occasioned by the War • "
It

What was the basic
system?

c~use

of the failure of the factory

Scholars have advanced many reasons.

That traders could

extend credit to the Indians while the tactor could not bas been
a popular explanation for the failure.

6,3

As sbown by John

Biddle's testimony, Irwin did extend credit to both white. and

50
Indians.

Crooks and Stuart also frowned on traders giving credit

to the Indians so this traditional explanation loses much of its
credibility.

Whiskey could not be considered the only major

cause since the American Fur Company vas not anxious to have the
trader deal in this commodity.
to the fur trader as the tactor.

A drunken Indian vas as little use
That the tactor could not ob-

tain Indian furs because he could not go to the hunting grounds hal
been another traditional eXPlanation. 64
Green Bay, however, this was not true.
own traders.

At least in the case ot
Irwin had dispatched his

In many respeots an early resident of Green Bay

found a plausible answer for Irwin's tailure.
Major I~in was a gentleman ot intelligence,
culture and integrity, and as well fitted for
the trust as any citizen totally unacquainted
with the Indian country, its trade and inhabitants, could be--that is, not fitted at all;
and moreover, being furnished by the government
with goods unsuited to the Indian trade, and
comins in competing contact with lite-lons
experienced, astute traders, ot course the
effort to gain confidence, trust and influence
with the Indians was a total tailure. Hi.
sleazy, woolen blankets, cheap calico, and
worst of all, his poor unserviceable guns, were
all rejected by the Indian.; and during his four
years trade, he dlernot secure titt7 dollar.
worth of peltries. ~
Thus, the factory's failure was the result ot a combination

ot factors:

the unsuitable personnel (both Jacob Varnum and

Matthew Irwin were from the East), unsuitable goods, and the
whiskey problem.

The proble., though, can be reduce. to more

baaic considera)ions.

The tactory was a 8mall business attempting
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to compete with the vast organization of the American Fur Company.
In addition, the success of the factory was impossible because
of the government's inability to establish a consistent policr in
relation to the Indian trade.

The government, by tollowing a

two-sided Indian trade policy, br allowing private traders to
flourish while the factory was in existence, was a totallr inadequate arrangement.

By allowing private traders in the terri-

tory, the government provided the competition which ruined its
own factories.

How could a government business with appropria-

tions ot only .300,000 compete with established private traders
and the emerging million dollar capital ot the American Pur
66
Companr' With the abolition ot the factory srstem, the government
at least recognized its inability to follow a dual policy.

The

government now merely sought to control and regulate the traders,
not compete with the••
The tinal closing ot the factory was a contused and tragic
incident.

In 1821, McKenney had ordered Vamua and Matthew Irwin

to begin the aale ot their remaining goods on a cash or credit
baais. 67 Such a policy was in accord with John Calhoun's Report
issued in 1818 that the factoriea ahould be liquidated over a
period of time.

Benton, in his zeal to end the syste., demanded

their closing within two montha.

Several Washington businessmen

were commissioned to take charge otthe final accounting.

Theae

men, coming trom the East, were totally unacquainted with the
68
factory and the type of business conducted.
lte.dless to aay,

52
Benton'. hasty action caused an ultimate loss ot government funds
and added credence to those who had claimed the factory had always
been an impractical scheme.

In Chicago, Jacob Varnum had mer-

chandi.e worth nearly $1),000.

t

A. B. Lindsay. who was commi ••

sioned to close the factory, eventually realized only $1,250 in
69
cash from this merchandise.
Lindsay took the merchandise to Detroit where it was aold
at prices far below cost.

In addition, the outstanding debts ot

Indians and white. were totally ignored because of the two-month
close-out period.?O

Varnum, the Chicago factor, characterized

the policy ot Thomas Hart Benton and the Congress aa completely
inept:
Mr. Benton had his own way. It was not probable
that one in ten in Congress knew muoh about an
obscure system for the benetit of the Indians,
inaugurated long before a large portion ot the
members were elected. He debated it alone • • •
oarried 811 measures, one of which was so absur.e
as to require a new let of agents to relieve the
old one and whose duty it would be to wind up the
concerns. !he effect ot this measure, so far
a8 the Chicago factory was concerned was a total
lOIS of all government property. A. B. Lindsay,
a hanger-on about the otfices tor an apPoint-?l
ment tor years, obtained the situation • • •
With the tactories closed, the American Pur Company was freed

ot its most sustained competition.

This Company now spread its

power over not only the Indian trade but every aspect of frontier
lite.

r

CHAPTER V
THE CONDUCT OF THE FUR TRADE:

THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY'S CONTROL

OF THE TRADE AND MANIPULATION OF THE FRONTIER COMMUNITY, 1821-24
Before the abolition ot the Green Bay factory, the American
Fur Company had made a decided ettort to gain the cooperation of
the Green Bay traders.

After their citizenship had been obtained,

Lawe, the Grignons, and Jacques Porlier each traded on his own
account with the Company.

1

This caused a considerable reduction

in profits aince the traders were competing with each other.
John Lawe traded in the immediate vicinity of Green Bay, Charles
Grignon at the Portage of the POX-Wisconsin, Augustin Grignon at
Grand Kakahlin, Louis Grignon on the Wisconsin, while Jacques
Porlier located on Overton's Creek flowing into the upper end ot
Lake Butte de Borts. 2 During the season ot 1820-21, the Green
Bay traders continually complained about the poor hunt. 3

Betore

the 1821 trading season began, then, the American Pur Company
suggested that several ot the Bay traders form a partnership to
reduce their los....

The agr.ement included five trader.; Louis,

Pierre, and Augustin Grignon, John Lawe, and Jacques Porlier.
The traders agreed to share the protits derived, each partner receiving one-titth. the profit. or lo •• es.

Under the term. ot the

contract, tour members were to trade in the interior while one
signatory remained at Green Bay to handle the busineas arfairs.
Goods tor the trade were to be obtained from the American Fur
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company under the name ot the Green Bay Oompany.

The oontraot

was to last for three years until August 1, 1824. 4
Diffioulties arose oonoerning the oontraot beoause Jacques
Porlier, who before 1821 had traded on a partnership with Louis
Rouse, was not present to sign.

Ramsay Crooks, thel'efore, signed

for Porlier hoping he would enter the agreement.
Po~lier

Informing

of his action, Crooks persuaded him to enter the agree-

ment sinoe the competition would otherwise plaoe him in inextrioable eoonomio diffioulties. 5

The Green Bay traders had

fallen into debt by oompeting with each other in the tr.de.

The

american Pur Company had supplied their individual needs until
this contract.

By torming this contr.ot, the Green B.y tr.der.

admitted the cDntrol which the Amerioan Fur Oompany exerted over
their eoonomic livelihood.

Thi. control w••••p.oi.lly evident

in the formation ot the contr.ct.

The Am.rican Fur Company

agreed to .upply only the tive tr.ders sp.cified in the contr.ct.
Therefore numerous other traders suoh as Lewis Rouse, who had
previously traded tor the Company, were left without goods for
the trade.

6

The Green Bay Company immediately encountered difficultie.
with the terms of the oontraot.

Stuart had agreed to refr.in

from sending any other tr.der. to deal with the Menomine. Indians
7
within the Oreen Bay regioh.
The Green Bay tr.ders, however,
deoided to follow the Menominees all the w.y to the Mississippi

ss
River territory which belonged to Joseph Rolette trom Prairie du
Chi.n.

Eventually, Crooks and Stuart gave Augustin Grignon p.r-

mission to .nter Rol.tte's area but only above the talls ot It.
Anthony.

Crooks also told Rolette that Augustin Grignon would

ent.r his trading territory, but at the sa.e time aaaured Rolette
that he could trade with the Menominee. it Grignon's pre.ence
cau.ed .eriou. economic 10••• 8

In 1822, the Gre.n Bay trader. again faced heavy lo•• es.
Crooks had little patience with these men.
characterized their business attitude as •

He sarca.tically

• • • an unconquerable

aver.ion to economy, and their only care ....s to be to get into
their prote.sion the means ot p"pering their indolence-- a want
of principle i. everJWhere apparent."

Crooks's comment about

"a want ot principl." was prompted by the actions ot Augustin
Grignon who had gone to wint.r belov the talls ot St. Anthony an
the Mississippi River.

Rolett. had extensive cr.dits tor trade

goods with the Sioux in thi. area.

According to Crooks, Grignon

had taken th.ir turs knowing they vere indebted to Rolette.

Ad-

mitting that hi. intoraatlon vas merely here.ay, Crooks supported
Rolette's accusations.

Bis .tory vas supported not becau.e it

va. nece.sarily true, but becau.e he vas a aore Bucce••tul trader.
Rolette'. ability to extract

t~emendou.

protits trom the trade,

Crooks realized, demanded that his connection with the Company
9
be maintained.
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The presence ot Augustin Grignon in Rolette'. territory
finally exploded into violence.

In January, 1822, Augustin

Grignon's trading house was burned and his goods confiscated by a
band of Sioux.

Louis Grignon immediately advised his brother to

discover the cause of the Indian's hostility.

10

A8 soon as

Ramsay Crooks heard of the incident, he suspected that Rolette's
ambition had carried him too far.

11

Jacques Porlier, a partner

in the Green Bay Company, took more immediate action.

Writing to

Governor Cass, Porlier accused Rolette of inciting the Indians.
He pointed out that Rolette also had an outfit 1n the same area
which the supposedly unattached Indians did not molest.

Further,

Porlier claimed that the Indians admitted that they had been
incited by a white trader.

12

Cass forwarded the accusations

against Rolette to John Calhoun, the Secretary of War, advising
that Rolette's license be revoked. l ) Lack of evidence, however,
prevented the agent tor Indian affairs at Prairie du Chien troM
trom initiating legal action against Rolette. 14
The American Fur Company temporarily eliminated the trouble
between Rolette and Grignon by concluding a contract in which
both men agreed to refrain from trading with the Indians usually
credited by the other.

Stuart was quite sure that the Green Bay

traders would berak the agreement, but he felt that he must continue to employ them lest the territory be overrun

by

15

competition.

Stuart had a great deal more confidence in the abilities ot

57
Rolette and provided him with muoh larger quantities of goods
than any of his oompetitors or fellow traders.

Realizin~

that

Rolette oould destroy the business of any of his oompetitors,
Stuart cautioned him that, although suoh aotion would rid the
Amerioan Fur Company of an eoonomio liability (Green Say Company),
16
other oompetitors might prove more harmful.
Rolette followed
the advice of Stuart and Crooks and entered into a mutual agreement with the Green Bay Company.l7
The Amerioan Fur Company kept Joseph Rolette well supplied
with goods and even supported his most treacherous actions.

A

most interesting oontrast was the attitude and polioy followed
with less sucoessful members of the Green Bay Company.

As early

as October, 1821, Stuart expressed his dissatisfaotion with the
18
With the destruction of Augustin
Green Bay Company's returns.
Grignon's outfit by Rolette, the prospects tor the trade ot 1822
appeared dim.

Although the American Pur Company realized the

Green Bay Companr would make tew protits, Crooks and Stuart refused to give up their economic control ot the area by breaking
the contract.

Stuart decided to aocept the losses of the Green

Say Company rather than to throw the

~erritory

open to competition

• • • Sesides I know that Lockwood made them a
liberal ofter to supply all their wants; and let
the result be loss again, they would have strengthened his opposition, so as to make it of serious
consequence to our operation tor there would be no
restraint whatever; and it would be throwing them
completely into the arms of our opponents, which,
as I have alreadr stated might be of no beneficial
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result to either of them, but still must have 19
turned out of seriQus detriment to us.
John Lawe was dissatisfied with the American Fur Company and
their supposed beneficent trade arrangements.

According to Lawe,

he and the other Bay traders were forced to form the Green Bay
Company,

The American Fur Company, then, sold them goods at out-

rageous prices and limited the areas in which they coul. trade,
Lawe claimed.

Lawe was aware ot Crooks's tactical maneuvers.

He

realized that the Company" • • • didn't wish I believe to ruin
us tor tear an opposition might form and come into the country."

20

On the contrary, Lawe said, the Ameridan Fur Company wished to
take their furs at the lowest possible prices, thus keeping the
Green Bay traders in debt.

To accomplish this, the American

Fur Company sent other men to trade with the Menominees, refused
to allow Lawe to trade at Milwaukee, and opposed the Green Bay
Company at the Portage of the Wisconsin and down the lower
Wisconsin River. 2l
Robert Stuart, accused ot waging open war on the Green Bay
Company's trading area, denied it unconditionally:
it is an insinuation that we do

80,

n •••

It

I deny the tact • • • In

short I am convinced you are fully sensible that it is not in any
way in our interest to injure your concern. n22

It would seem

highly probable that the Green Bay traders were harsh in their
claims that Stuart was flooding their territory with opposing
traders.

By the arrangements ot the American Pur Company each

...
$9
""'" -------------------------------------------------------------trader had a specifio territory; for

e~mple,

Josep. Rolette in

the Prairie du Chien area and Solomon Juneau and J. Beaubien at
Milwaukee.

The Green Bay traders, on the other hand, in an attemp1

to reooup past 108ses filtered throughout the area from Milwaukee
to the Mississippi.

Despite the harsh aotion8 of Rolette,

Augustin Grignon

infringed upon his territory.

~ad

Although Stuart may have been innocent of flooding the territory of the Green Bay Company with opposing traders, he oertainly
was preJudioed in other business arrangements with the Green Bay
Company.

As early as 1821, Crooks warned the Green Bay men that.

the Company would only supply a limited number of trade goods,
sinoe they were all purohased on oredit.

23 At the same ttme,

where an outfit did particularly well, the Amerioan Fur Oompany
provided, on oredit, .s many goods as reQUested. 24

Although this

may have been good business strategy, it lett the Green Ba,.
traders with little hope ot ever improving their economio position
Without an adequate supply of goods they oould not stand up to
competition, nor were there suffioient profits among five people.
Thus, the Green Bay Company graduall,. fell deeper into debt to
the Amerioan Fur Compan,. whose power increased over ever,. aspect
of the trader's life.
To protect the American

p~

Company against the debts ot the

Green Bay Oompany" Crooks decided to obtain mortgages on their
property.

Aocording to Crooks's estimate, the Green Bay Company
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owed $16,000 in debts:
Comment is unnecessary, we must • • • secure
by Mortgages what oan be got at and should you
get mortgages let their terms be of as short
duration as possible -- for I am doubttul how
the most of those gentry stand affected towards2~
us.
~
Ihicago presented an entirely different problem for the
American Fur Company.

In 1821-22, Chicago was still a relatively
26
SMall village with nine or ten houses occupied by French traders.

The number of Indians in the Chicaf.o area was nearly double that
of the Green Bal area, thus enabling the SMaller numbers of
Chicago traders to reap greater profits. 27 In addition, the
Chicago trade was conducted in a different manner than at Green
Bay.

In 1821, the combined nations of the Potawato.i, Ottawa,

and Chippewa ceded five million acres ot land to the United States
In return for this land, the government agreed to pay the Indians
an annual subsidy at or near Chicago.

The American Fur Company

and tur traders, then, decided to change the operation of the
Indian trade.

Now the traders vould descen. upon Chicago during

the annuity payments to exchange goods for the Indian's newly
aoquired money.

Although these annuity payments did not supplant

the older method of trade in furs, they did provide a lucrative
traffio in Money from the Indian trade.

28

Chicapo, then, vas

potentially a more lucrative trading area beoause of the smaller
,

white population, the presence of a larger number ot Indians, a.
well as the trade at the annuity payments.
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Chicago proper, however, was not a trading ar&Q.' Like Green
Bay, Chicago was the depot for the collection of turs and dispersal of gOOd8 tor the traders of the interior.

Gurdon Hubbard,

a proMinent Chicago trader, was led to remark that "by this time
(1820) there wa8 a very liMited trade here, in taot, thi8 plaoe
never had been preeminent a8 a trading post.n

29

With the withdrawal of the Cactory system, the American Fur
Company began to oonsolidate its hold on the Chteago area.
Chicago as compared to Green Bay was not a closely organized
society and each diCferent trader had to be gathered into the fold
of the Company.

From 1821-24. the Americ&n Fur Company i* its

efforts to organize the Chicago area did not reap great profits.
John Crafts, the former agent of the Gonnent and Mack Company, finally joined the American Fur CompaIl)" in 182.3.

Crnf'ta

was especially obstinate about his trading territory and wage
contract.

Originally Crafts wished to receive the various goods

from Michililllackinac on joint account with John Kinzie, including the territories of the Illinois River, Chicago. Milwaukee,
30
St. Joseph, Fort Wayne, and the wabash.
Robert Stuart objected
to the contract for two reasons.

He was hesitant about em-

ploying John Kinzie since he was then sub-Indian agent.

Govern-

Mental authorities, Stuart thought, might object to Kinzie serving
both the CompanJ and the government.

Seoondly, such an agreement

would have infringed upon the territories assigned to other trade

outfits such as Beaubien at Milwaukee, John Lawe at Green Bay,
and Hubbard on the Illinois River.

Eventually, Crafts obtained

an area which included the Rock River, the Fox River counties,
and the immediate neighborhood of Chicago. 3l Crafts a180 avoided
the profit-sharing wage agreement with the Company and instead received an annuel salary of $1000.

This wage alreement displeased

Robert Stuart aince the American Fur Company would have to suffer

32

all the 10s8ea on the Chicago outfit while Crafts received $1000.
Gurdon Hubbard, like the tradera at Green Bay, was also extremely displeased with the pay of the American Fur Companr.

In

1823, Hubbard consIdered quitting the Indian trade if a raiae was
not forthcoming.))
year as a clerk.
counter him

8S

Hubbard, since 1818, had drawn onll $260 per
Stuart, rather than lose hi. aervices and en-

a competitor, appointed him head of the Illinois

outfit at an annual salary of $400. 34 With territories rather
olearly delineated and capable persona employed, Stuart was now
ready to exploit the Chicago trade.
The operations ot the trade throughout the period were characterized by the tremendous influence ot the American Fur Companr
on both the national and local level.

In Chicago, John Kinzie

was serving as sub-Indian agent, yet he also maintained business
relations with the American Fur Compan7.

These relations wore

eapecial17 evident in 1824 when John Crafts left tor Mackinao,
and the Ohicago post was placed in the charge ot John Hamlin.
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While Crafts was absent, John Kinzie was evidentl,. conneoted with
the trade even though sub-Indian agent.

Stuart wrote Htmlin ex-

pressing confidence in his ability to cere tor the post but
assuring him that John Kinzie would give all the help possible
despite his delicate position. 35

Kinzie's position was especially

delicate at this time since the Indian annuity pa,.ents were
arriving trom Washington.

Wishing to prosper trom

th~s

annual

payment, Hamlin sent to Mackinac for an extra supply ot 800ds,36
Kinzie, as an Indian 'agent, was suppo.ed to protect tne Indian
from the selling ot goods at intlated price. by the trader; but
his position .ee.ed to waver between the interests ot the
snd the A.erican Pur Company.

Indi~

John Kinzie'. relation to tne

Company vas apparent in 1823 when Stuart oautioned David Laughton,
a Chicago trader, not to emploJ anJ gooda in the Indian annultJ'

37

trade until John Eins!. could exert hi. intluence on the Indian ••
On the national level, the American Fur Cpmpany bad long

wished to .ee the complete abolition ot the liquor trade with the
Indians.

L1.quor not on11 led to atrocities bJ' the Indians but

also inhibited their abilit,. to hunt.

In 1828, therefore, the

government passed a law definitel,. outlawing an,. liquor tram
being transported into the Indian territor,.

The law provided

penalties of confiscation of goods and trading lic8nae..

38 The

Green Bal' traders welcomed the ne" lav since their major oppoaltion came trom traders employing interior goods but a large

39

supply of whiske1.·.

r
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The American Pur Company, however, drasticall, altered their
40
policy toward the use of liquor in the late l820'a.
By this
time, Stuart vas quite ready to admit that the Companl utilized
liquor in its trade.
• • • There are .everal parts of the country
we had much better abandon than .end without it;
and in short ve must either send aome vherever
there is oPPosition, particularll along the
trontier • • • or • • • ve must give up that trade
entirely; if lOU think proper to leave this
matter to my discretion I teel confident we shall
not otten get into ditticulty; and should you
forbid it altogether. rest assured the consequence
will be extremely injurious; ot this Mr. Crooks
vho you can consult, must be tully senaible, tor
he cannot have torgotten hov much we suttered by n
not sending liquor in 1817 and 1818 •• _ _
~l
Stuart, theretore, concluded an agreement with Governor Cass,
ae was allowed to employ limited quantities ot liquor where
British opposition was most pronounced.

The territories in which

this liquor was permitted inCluded the Green Bay and Chicago
regions. 42 In 182$. the American Pur Company bought nearly 3,000
gallons ot vhiskeyand 2,000 gallons ot high wlnes. 43 In 1826,
Stuart intormed John Kinzie that tne chier commodity ot the outtit for that year would be liquor. 44

The strange aspect ot the

entire liquor policy vas Stuart'. claim that the liquor vaa u.ed
to root out British opposition around Green Bay and Chicago.

In

actual fact, before 1822, Stuart had already captured these areas
from the British and any British trader. in the are. were probably
employed by the Company_

In essence, it seemed as if Stuart vas

r

/
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using national policy to consolidate hi. monopoly by driving out
private traders who were usually American citizens.

B1 1827,

Stuart'. prerogative to use liquor in certain areas was ended.
Governor Cass was finally directed by Waahington otficials to
allow no exceptions to the liquor law ot 1822. 45
In 1824, the United States government passed another law
designed to regulate the conduct of the Indian trade.

This law

specifically .tated that:
Indian agent. to de.ignate, from time to time,
certain convenient and .uitable places for
carrying on trade with the dirferent Indian
tribe. and to require all traders to trade at
46
the place thus designated, and at no other place.
The law enabled Indian agents to exercise .tricter control
over the traders.

In this way Briti.h trader. could be eliminated

trartic in whiskey could be curtailed, and the Indian'. weltare
could be .ateguarded.

The law wa. originally .upported by the

American Pur Company, tor it provided another legal mean. tor the
Company to eliminate competition.

In the Green Bay region and

throughout the territory, license. granted to a priYate trader
required him to trade at a de.ignated .pot.

The American Pur

Company would then er.ct a post nearby and reduce the price of it.
goods so dra.tically that the private trader would be forc.d out
of bu.in....

Once the private trader had been eliminated, the

Company would rai.e it. prices to recoup the lo.ses .uttered in
breaking down the oppo.ition. 47

The law va. al.o quite tavorable

r
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to the Green Bay traders since the posts designated by Indian
agent Breevoort were those ordinarily used by the Green Say
traders.

The posts assigned to the Green Say traders included:

Grand Kakahlin, Winnebago Lake at the post Fond du Lao, Butte de
Morts, Portage at the Wisoonsin, upper Wisconsin, and Milwaukee.

48

Although the law operated quite favorably for the Company in
the Green Bay area, the Chicago region became a trouble spot.

The

looal Indian agent, Dr. Woloott, refused to grant trading locationl
desired by Robert Stuart.

Stuart immediately wrote Governor Cass

and stated his displeasure with the law.

Cass had been quite

friendly and helpful to the Company on numerous oooasslona whioh
Stuart hoped would also apply to this situation.

Stuart felt

that the law was unfair, sinoe the Company's traders, being known
throughout the area, would be required to looate at a speoific
post.

Meanwhile, private traders, unknown by the Indian agent,

would be able to avoid the law.

This problem did not arise at

Green Bay beoause most of the traders ot that area resided in
Green Bay and were known to each other and the Indian agent.

Por

this reason, Stuart did not oonoeal his desire that Governor
Cas8 request Dr. Wolcott at Chicago to relax the law in the case
of the American Fur Company:
I hope, Sir, that lOU will have the goodness to
request Dr. Wolcott to grant Mr. Cratts lioenses
for this reason, with the usual privileges that
is, not to be contined to a designated spot, for
others have the liberty of running abtut in the
vicinity of their posts and it would be ruinous
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for him not to have the same advantage. 49
To avoid losing the profits of the

18~

Chicago outfit,

stuart wrote to George 507d, the Indian agent at Mackinac, asking
him to grant Crafts a license tor one 7ear.

$0

Knowing that 50yd

was quite friendly toward the Compan7, Stuart hoped to supercede
the authority of Dr. Wolcott of Chicago and avoid the restrictions
of the national legislation.
While Stuart was working behind the scenes pulling political
strings, he warned John Crafts to obey the law 'as far as the
$1
situation would permit,
As the winter trade sea80n approached, Stuart became more

ea...nt

in his objections to the law.

Both aeorge Boyd at

Mackinac and Dr. Wolcott at Chicago had refused to grant the privileges requ.ated.
circumvent the law.

Stuart, therefore, advised John Crafts to
Pollow the Indians into the territory not

for trade but tor the purpose of collecting debts and establishing
credit, Stuart told Cratts,

52

Stuart quite correctly knew that

the law only forbade traders to conduct trade in furs and goods
outside the designated post, while sa71ng nothing about extending
credit,

Furthermore, Stuart suggested a means whereby the law

could be totally ignored,
• • • But in the event ot his adhering to his
first determination, and that 70ur trade sutters;
you must altho very repugnant to the inclinations
ot the Company, or its agenta, use the only means
left you in aecuring us from serious loss, which
is to contine your unlicensed trade to the lands
ce.ed to the United States. • • •
53
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Since the Indian agent only possessed jurisdiction over the
Indian territory. Crafts could trade along the boundary between
ceded and unceded lands without being required to locate at any
definite post.

By the Indian treaty ot 1821, large segments ot

land in the Chicago area had been obtained by the United States.
This land, then, would constitute the area in which Stuart and
Cratts would once again avoid the laws of the United States.
Despite hil many objections to the law, Stuart received
little aid fram Governor Cass or the national go_ernment.

The

law had little effect on Green Bay, but it was disastrou. in
Chicago and other trade regions.

In 1826, Stuart was still quite

active in attempting to secure the law's repeal.
reasons for this repeal.

He cited two

Because the Indian trapping areas

varied trom year to year due to the increasing scarcity of game,
the trading posts had to tollow such movements.

Stuart teared

that a post established one year might be located too tar away
for etrective trade the next.

Secondly, it was extremely ditti-

cult to advance the Indians any credit under such a s7stem.

It

the trader could not tollow the Indians into their hunting
grounds, he could not determine the prospects ot the trade, nor
could he be assured, after advancing credit, that the Indians
would deliver the furs. 54

The law remained on the books, never-

theless, since it was preci.ely these abu••• which the gov.rnment
wi.hed to eliminate.

Many times the trader would advance the

Indians creditJ and then he would pay a low price for the turs,

r
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dragging the Indians deeper into debt.

With designated posts,

the Indian agent could prevent many or these abuses.
In this period of consolidation, 1821-24, 'the American Fur
Company had firmly established economic control over Green Bay,
Chicago, and Milwaukee.

The Oreen Bay Oompany was in complete

subservience through debts to Astor's tirm.

In Ohicago, the

American Pur Oompany had just initiated ita control.

On the

rrontier, this control waa evident in the utilization ot local
otficiala, auch aa Major Puthutt and George Boyd, tor the benetit
of the Company.

The national legislation passed in 1822 and 1824

to control the operation ot the trade had little ettect on the
Oompanr_

It Crooks and Stuart tound the lavs harmful to the

conduct ot 'business, they either obtained permission trom looal
otticials to avoid the lavs or operated against the spirit ot the
legislation.

During this period ot the American Fur Company's

consolidation, nevertheless, the nature ot trontier societ7 was
changing.

These

chan~e8

gradually undermined the fur trade

societ7 and the monopoly ot the American Pur Company.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUR TRADE IN TRANSITION:

THE AMERICAN

FUR COMPANY IN GREEN BAY AND CHICAGO,

1824~1828

While the government vas establishing lawa to regulate the
Indian trade, the community of Green Bay waa undergoing a rapid
transformation.

As the trade oontinually declined, the original

inhabitants were beaieged by an advancing civilization.
Between 1819 and 1824, Green Bay experienoed an influx of
settler., not Prench or British in extraction, but Americana
from the East.

Gradually, such people brought an

ener~etic

and

stronrly competitive torm of lite to the carefree community.l
During this period merohants, suoh as Daniel Whitney. Robert
Irwin, and Colonel Childs. arrived.

Prote.aional men. SUCA as
2
James Doty. Henry Baird, and Judge Arndt, also came.
By 1824,
Green Bay was still predominately Prenoh and British, but also had
aix or eight enterprising American tamilie.,3
This new immigration exerted a definite ettect on the old
tur trader.,

In 1822, the soldiers had moved out ot Port Howard

to Camp Smith, two miles up the river.

Here the new immigrants

established what came to be known aa Shanty Town to supply the
wants of the soldier. and their tamilie..

There were two prin-

ei"l store. in Shanty Town which supplied merohandiae to the
oommunity.

The.e .tores vere operated by Daniel Whitney and

Robert Irwin. 4

Whitney, by the judgement ot hia oontemporaries,

vas the most ambitious businessman ot the territory_
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Be employed
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{

several clerks in his store and eventually brought carpenters,
blacksmiths, painters, and farmers to the area.

5

Whitney pro-

vided • direct threat to the native fur traders by providing a
non-American Fur OompanY' concern where the re.idents could purchase good. at competitive price..
supplied traders with goods.

In addition, Whitney also

Lawe, Augustin Grignon, and Jacque.

Parlier faced serious opposition from Whitney.

To make matter.

worse, he besan to outfit the younger brothers of Augustin
Grlf:non.

I:>

Even though Whitney only began operation in Green Bay during
1820, by late 1821 he posed a proble..

Robert Stuart considered

Whitney'. venture doomed to failure and cautioned Lawe about extending his credits to compete with h1a. 1 In 1822, Stuart, because he had .ent the Green Bay Company les. than a full complement of good. due to hi. lack of trust in taeir abilitie., became
worried that the Green Ba1 traders might purchase extra supplies
from Whitney_

Stuart knew, that .ince Whitney was located at the

Bay, he would receive paJment tor the goods advanced before the
American Fur Oompany.

To prevent any auch oocurrence, he oau-

tioned Augustin Grignon against any bu.ine.s arrangement with
8
Whitney without the Company'. knowledge.
The presence of Robert Irwin at Green Bay also oaused little
initial concern to Stuart.

Oommenting on the store ot Robert

Irwin, Stuart said he " _ _ _ believed the house of whioh Mr.
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Irwin i8 8aid to be agent will create more nolse than ettect,
9
but it more tools will come, why we must weloome thelll."
John
Lawe considered the men in Shanty Town a more serious threat.

In

November, 182), Lawe wrote to his partner Jacque. Porlier that
the traders in Shanty Town were attempting to deal with Indians
who already were on credit to the Green Bay Campany.

Lawe warned

Parlier to collect all debts betore the Indians departed tram
the interior.

If at all possible, Lave exhorted, keep the

Indians away tram Green Bay. 10

Lawe vaa eapecial17 distrusttul

aince the Indians were making .ery rew hunt. and, even those tew
peltrie. they collected, were taken to Shanty Town.

Th. control

ot the trade, Lawe said, vas alipping tram hia handa aino . . . . .
• it is true that they (Shanty

To~)

aell so very low and that

their goods are so muoh cheaper than ours that it toea enti••
both the White. and Indians to trade with tne•• - ll Both the
American Fur Company and the Green Bay traders reared that the
new oOllDl'leroial elements would engage in the fur trade to supplement their small busines8 with other white settlers.
The Green Bay traders also viewed the presenoe or military

torces a8 a detinite hinderance to their aociety.

Contrary to

some idyllic aocounts ot the role at the military in the settlement at the country, it was definitely or little aid to the Green
12
The military post during the 1820'a
Bay region betore 1829.
was a self-sufficient economic unit.

All 8upplles and gooda tor

r
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the post were brought tram the commissary otfice in Washington.
Not until the 1830's did the communit7 at Green Ba7 supp17 the
13
needs ot Fort Howard.
ThU8, the military personnel stationed
at Fort Howard provided not only a 80urce of rules and regulations
for the inhabitants but a180 a competitive economic

unit.~

The soldiers were unpopular with the residents.

John Lawe

accused 80ldiers ot driving ott his tew cattle and slaughtering
his pigs.

At one time, they broke into his trading store and con-

fiscated a large part ot the merchandise.

The soldiers travelled

at night in gangs of ten or twelve ransaeking tne stores, Lawe
8ald, and thus he was forced to " • • • keep a great quantity ot
dogs about the bouse tor to keep up (sic) a constant barking.
wish that regiment was exchanged tor

~le7

I

are a great nuisance in

place of a protection tor the citizens • • •

,,15

Lawe was .speolally critioal ot the economic arrangements
or the

~ort.

Eaoh tort poasessed a Butler's store which bad a

large stock ot merchandise tor the needs ot the soldlers.

With

this supply of goods the Butler otten dealt with tn. white population.

Besides, the soldiers

the trader's store..

ra~.lJ

purchased merchandi.e

r~om

To permit one man, the sutler, to trade

merohandis8 under little threat

or

eoonomio 10•• was in Lawe's

opinion an injustioe to the members ot the oommunity.

In Lawe'.

Judgement, the milItary" • • • were a nuisance to society and in
place of being put there tor the

~roteetion

of the place they
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are the destruction ot it • • • "16
The eftects of both the competition ot Shanty Town and the
disruptions of the military were clearly evident in the economic
condition ot the fur trade.

In 182), David Stone and Company ot

Detroit (formerly Stone Bostwick & Company), a competitor of the
American Fur Company, had decided to merge with Stuart and CrookS.
This merger necessitated a complete accounting ot the Company's
books.

Theretore, Robert Stuart notified the various outtits

that all accounts would be settled at the end of the 1823 season;7
Robere Stuart planned to use this opportunity for concluding new
arrangements for the Green Bay area.

ae tound the Green Bay

traders totally incapable of managing a corporate struoture such
as the Green Bay Company.

Many ot the Green Bay traders were now

negleoting to go into the Indian oountry, remaining instead at
the Bay.

Stuart also objected to the increasing number of rela-

tives hired as 'agents ot the Green Bay Company.

ae intended to

close out their books, and trom then on only supply a limited
number of traders in the Green Bay area.

Stuart expressed conti18
dence onlr in the abilities ot John Lawe and Augustin Grignon.

He was not anxious to engage in business with white settlers and
preferred to maintain interests onlr in the fur trade.
Although the Green Bay Company was disolved, Stuart continued
to supply a large number of people in the Green Bay area.

While

the Green Bar Companr had only been a partnership of tive people,
thus at least assuring these five people a share ot the protits,
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noW the American Pur Company supplied individual tradera in the
area.

While on11 five people with a supply of goods totaling

$8,626 were employed in 1824, by 1825 the trade waa expanded with
fourteen people and only $8,)44 in gooda.

By 1826, the number ot

people trading was twenty-two with an increase to $11,617 in the
value ot goods. 19 Thua, the proti ts derived by any aingle individual were considerably reduced; and, added to the many competitive factora in the co. .unit~, it ia little wonder that the
majority of traders were in debt to the American Pur Company.
With the number ot fur bearing animals deolining, the ml1l"1'J':,'an4 Shant,. Town providing competition, the territory overrWl
with traders, one mlght aak why dldn't the tradera aeek a new
occupation!

Why continue in an ocoupation which aurel,. wa. in'.

c~patl.

of yielding any profita'

Part ot the explanation la,. in

the ••allnea. ot the population making farming and other oraft.
also unprotitable.

Por the.e orlginal inhabitants, John Lawe

exprea.ed the dilemna into which a changing oivilization had
plunged the.:
I will commence in aaying that the first year
atter the War waa the last year I aaved m1aelt
for every year aince I have been loaing mone1
and not a little in that curaed Indian trade
that I have alwaya peraisted and 40 still peraist
to continue (but lOU may well aa1 or aak the question why do you still oontinue since you find it a
losing businesa) I will say I do not know what to
do elae as I am not capable ot doing or following2
any other kind of businesa.
0
From 1823-1828, the atory of the Green Bay fur trade was one
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of gradually dwindling profits.

The few profits the Green Sal

traders gained w.re still being threaten.d by Jos.ph Rolette.
Rolette was now in conflict with the Indians of James Porlier.

21

Robert Stuart indicated little conc.rn with the complainta ot
Porlier and Lawe against Rolette.

Rather, Stuart blam.d both

Lawe and Porli.r because they departed so late for the winter
trading grounds.

By the time Porli.r arrived at the Portage ot

the Pox-Wisconsin, the Indians had alread7 b.en forced, b7
necessitl, to purchase goods troa Rolette it they were to b.gin
the bunt.

In

Stuart telt Rolette's actions were the tault
ot Porlier hi.selt; and, thu., he retu.ed to take any action. 22
SUll,

B7 1827, Porlier told Augu.tin Grignon that the post at the
Portage ought to be abandoned.

Thi. action was requir.d b7 the

competition ot Rolette, the graduall7 d1lll1ni.hine; number ot
Indian., and their lack ot di.po.ition to hunt. 23
Stuart realized the dwindling protit. ot the fur trade.
According17, he in.ured him.elt again.t heavy 10•••• b7 .upplying
individual trad.rs only on a commia.ion basia.

Stuart agr.ed to

supply Jacques Vieau ot Gr••n Bay tor trade in the Milwaukee ar.a.
but he stipulated that Vieau must work on a strict profit-sharing
scheme. 24

Stuart concluded such a cautious agreement with Vieau

aince. the Milwaukee territol"J wa. ov.rrun with trad.rs.

Jean

Beaubi.n, Sololl1on Jun.au, and James .l{inzi. w.r. again trading
there.

In addition, John Law. had sent a trad.r to Milwaukee. 2S
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Stuart became even more cautious about the trade When he lent
Mich.el

Douama~."

the other

American Pur Company agent, to assist Lawe and

traders~Dousman,

more acourately, was sent to Oreen

Bay for the protection ot the AMerican Fur Company's intere.ts.
St~art

vi3hed to exercise striot supervision over the administra-

tion ot the Green Bay trade.

He speoitically instructed the

traders to issue no more credit. to the Indians tor a winter'.
outtit.

The large number or traders now in the territory, Stuart

said, lett little hope ot ever obtaining the furs credited to the
Indiana.

To prevent the merchandi.e stores or Shanty Town rrom

obtaining their furs, he told Mr. Dousman to ereot a store in the
Shanty

To~

ition.

area to enable him to keep a oareful e18 on the oppos-

Lave vas also instructd never to advance· the white popula-

tion any credit since the, had too rew occupations to guarantee
pa1l11ent.

Although Stuart did not outlav trade vith the white

.ettlers, he vas against makAng such business the primary occupation or the traders.

Thererore, he required that any trade con26
ducted with the vbitea muat be on a caah baaia.
The .trategic economic moves made by Stuart tor the benetit
ot the Green Bay traders had 11ttle etteot.

Por the trading

season ot 182$, not one Green Ba1trader realized a protit.
Stuart tound the ohiet reason tor the tailure in the opposition
provided bi Daniel WJiltne,.27

He now recognised the serious

threat that Whitney repre.ented to the American Pur Oompany •.. (,The
only way to end Whitne,'s interference in the trade, Stuart relt,
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was to emplor the traders upon whom he depended. Thus, Stuart
attempted to employ Paul and Amable Grignon. 28 This action
failed to materialize, and during the 1826 season, the American
Fur Company found itselt opposed by seven ••aders employed by
Daniel Whitner.

Theretore, Stuart (to protect himselt) warnod

his traders not to reduce their prices in oreier to ,compete with
Whitney's men.

Rather, Stuart lald. hold your goods and let
Whitney's men ruin each other in competltion. 29
Stuart had employed John Lawe to supervise the traders ot
the Green Bay area, but his perlonal taults caused Stuart some
trepidation.

Like an all-seeing boss, Stuart even tried to

regulate Lawe's private lite, where it atfected business matters.
In a letter the epitome of snide criticism and double meanings,
Stuart oautioned Lawe on his drinking habits.

Rumorl have

.,

circulated, Stuart said, whioh claimed that • • • • John Lawe il
as good as tellow as ever lIved, but must .oon ruin ht.lelt, tor
the whiskey bottle is never ott his table, and he drinks with
everrbodr, high or low, who loe. to his hou.e • • • • .30
In addition to Lawe'. rather loo.e drinking habits, he
aeemed to be a sott-touoh in business mattera.

Ooods sent to the

Green Bar area were entrusted to John Lawe for oirculation to the
individual traders.

Unfortunatelr. Lawe man, times dispensed

the.G goods to his friends and close neighbors without adequate
aecurit,_

In 1826. Stuart waa torced to iaaue a harsh warning

against this practice.

Lawe had given goods to Ghalfl:es Orignon
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without security, and now Grignon had compiled a large debt with
the Company.

Stuart warned Lawe that if he did not prosecute

Grignon in the courts, he would be held personally responsible
for the debt. 3l
With these many problems facing the Green Bay outfit, Stuart
expressed real fear concerning the trading season of 1826-27.
He expected a loss on all the outfits, but

~oped

that by next

year many of the traders would be forced into other occupations.

32

Stuart's fears were not without justification.

Green Bay had its
worst season collecting furs amounting to approximately $800. 33

Considering that a total of $11,617 of merchandise was advanced
for the entire area,
able sum.

34 the Green Bay traders had lost an irrepar-

The trade was not only bad for the American Fur Com-

pany traders, but Daniel Whitney also lost a considerable amount
of money.

If Stuart would be willing to compensate him, Whitney

was even prepared to give up any further ventures in the tur
trade.

Stuart, always the master strategist, refused Whitney'.

otfer.

Conditions were now just as Stuart wanted them.

Be

merely wished to produce a stalemate in the Green Bay area.

It

the American Fur Company could make no money from the trade, it
would at least maintain a token opposition for its competition.
Therefore, Stuart rejected Whitney'. offer to sell

ft

•••

for

altho we cannot abandon that trade, I would rather he should
supply some ot the people than we, tor whether there is opposiion

ou
or not, no money is to be made there. n35

Why Stuart mainta.ned

business connections. with the Green Bay traders has been difficult to judge.

Although the trade had declined, 3tuart apparently

feared that if competition was allowed to capture Green Bay, it
might spread to more prosperous trade areas.

In 1828, Stuart

sent a larse supply of goods to the Green Bay region for the last
time.

At this lete date, there were still sixteen persons trading

on goods worth $9,756.50. 36
In 1824, the influx of a few American iamilies had begun to
change the character of the trade and the nature of the settleIn 1824, Green Ba, still had les8 than a 150
permanent residents and the Frenc.-Britsh element was dominant. 37

ment at Green Bay.

By 1827-28, however, Green Bay possessed between seven and eight
hundred inhabitants.
dominated.

38

Clearly, the new American element now pre-

By 1835, the city of Gr&en Bay would possess little

resemblance to the fur trade village of a decade earlier.
While Green Bay was accumulating debts to the American Fur
Company from 1822-28, the Chicago area was experiencing its most
successful years in the

!~r

trade.

Chicago was more prosperous

as a trade center for several reasons.

The principal reason

rested on the delayed influence of civilization upon the fur trade
community.

In 1822, not only the competition of the factory

system was ended, but in this year the troops ot Fort Dearborn
39
The 8mall community at Chicago was now left
were withdrawn.
on its own.

While Green Bay was experiencing a graaual influx of
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Yankee emigrants, Chioago remained an isolated fur trade village.
One observer reported, upon passing through Chioago in 1827, that
" • • • the plaoe had not improved since 1821; only two families
yet resided there, those of Kinzie and Colonel Beaubien. n40
Although Chioago was small, after 1825 it did experience the
appearance of new settlers.

They did not, however, provide a real

threat to the conduct of the fur trade until 1827-28.
Although by 1822, Stuart and Crooks bad eliminated their
major competition tram the area, as in the Green Bay territory,
they were plagued with small competitors.

In June, 1824, John

I

Crafts was faced with the competition of a certain Oaptain
Whiting.

Whiting had attempted to employ so•• of Crafts's

traders.

This tactic was ended quickly by Crafts's hiring of his
41
men several months in advance.
In August, 1824, Stuart was distur~ed

by Captain Whiting's accusations that the Amerioan Pur

Company used cut-throat business tactics to eliminate their
opposition.

Finally, disgusted with Whiting's bothersome compe-

tition, Stuart authorized Crafts to use his disoretion in determining whether or not to purchase Whiting's business:

"Jou know

the resources ot the country and the extent of injury you are
likely to sustain from his winter operations. n42 By Maroh 2, 1825
Crafts had purchased 'the business of Captain Whiting ending one of
the few threats on the Company's monoPoly.43

William B. Astor,

in New York, was very critical of Crafts's action in buying out
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Whiting.

To Astor, the Company could hardly afford to purchase

the business of every small trader.

Stuart defended Crafts's

8.ction since Whiting had employed several traders to oppose him.
Besides, Stuart said, the decision appeared very opportune since
both the Illinois and Ohicago outfits were showing a considerable
profit. 44
Stuart remained worried lest independent traders gain a foothold in the Chicago area.

When John Crafts died in 182$, Stuart

advised that his trading store be destroyed " • • • rather than
let it fall into the hands of anyone in the trade. n45 Since the
new director of the Chicago trade planned to locate elsewhere,
Stuart said, the destruction of the trading store lDuld be ot no
consequence to the Company.
The Chicago area had problems with one other independent
trader by the name of Wallace.

Wallace brought a large supply of

liquor to the area.

Stuart warned Kinzie ot his intentions be-

fore his arrival. 46

In this way, Kinzie vas well aware ot the

competition he had to tace.
Betore the death ot Cratts in September of 1825, the Chicago
outfit faced another delicate problem with regard to personnel.
Jean Beaubien, who had originally forced John Cratts to join the
American Fur Company, had been transferred to Milwaukee after
1821 so that Crafts oould head the Chioago territory.

Beaubien

was dissatistied with hi. pOSition at Milwaukee whioh was a1read,
overrun with traders.

Stuart was obviousl, following the same

r
policy as with the Green Bay traders.

Since he did not have full

confidence in Beaubien's ability, he sent Beaubien less than a
full complement of goods so that the Company would not lose
money. 47 Beaubien refused to trade at the less prosperous Milwaukee location and, by 1825, was imposing on the Chicago territory.

StuaI·t considered this action in direct opposition to the

policies of the Company.

Thus he showed little sympathy with

Haaubien'a complaints of his economic prOble11ls. 48
Despite these several problems, the Chicago trade steadily
advanced under John Crafts's leadership,

By 1825, jllst a few

months before his death, Crafts felt sate in abandoning his previous wage agreement with the Company for $1000 per year.
Knowing that the Chicago trade faced bright prospeots, Crafts
chose to work under a profit-Rharing sCheme. 49

Crafts's ideas

on the fortunes of the Chicago trade were well calculated,
With the death of John Crafts in September, 1825, a delicate
problem aroae as to who would succeed as head of the Chicago
territory. 50

Beaubien's belligerant conduct while Crafts was

head eliminated him from the post.

Gurdon Hubbard, who was head

of the Illinois Outfit in the interior, was available but not
oompletely familiar with the personnel in the Chicago area.

John

Kinzie finally emerged as the firat choice ot Robert Stuart.
John Kinzie possessed two qualities which made him especially
valuable to the American Fur Co.mpany.

Firat, Kinzie was an ex-
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perienced fur trader, a life-long resident within the area, and
on friendly terms with the Indians.

Secondly, Kinzie, was then

the sub-Indian agent for the Chicago area under Dr. Alexander
Wolcott.

This position not only gave Kinzie a strong conneotion

with the Indian population, but placed him close to Dr. Wolcott
who had been definitely unfriendly to the Company in enforcing
the trade law of 1824.

John Kinzie was appointed head of the

Chicago trade with Jean Beaubien as his as.istant. 51

Beaubien's

assignment as assistant rather than head of the Chicago area was
occasioned by Stuart's distrust of his ability:
It is probably that Mr. Beaubien might have
conducted the whole tolerably well, but as I
have not full confidence in his capacity for so
extensive a concern I thought it best to
52
associate Mr. Kinzie with him • • • •
Stuart made it perfectly clear that Kinzie's decisions would
take precedence over those of Jean Beaubien. 53

Late in 182$,

Stuart found it necessary to caution Beaubien that his continual
feuding with John Kinzie had disrupted the conduc' of the

trade~4

The forgotten man in the plans of the American Fur Campany
for Chicago was Gurdon Hubbard.

Although the Chicago outfit ex-

perienced several prosperous years between 1824-27, Hubbard was a
good example of how the Company prospered while the traders
floundered.

In 182$, Hubbard received $400 per year, but he ex-

pected a raise when Crafts died.

55

With the assignment of Kinzie

to the Chicago post, Hubbard was prepared to leave the Indian

85
trade and take the post of sub-Indian agent which paid $500 per
year. 56
Despite these problems, the Chicago outfit realized a considerable profit in the 1824-25 season.

57

plausible reasons for Chicago's success.

There are several
First, the American Fur

Company held a more effective monopoly over the Chicago trade.
There vas not an important British influence nor were there American competitors such as at Shanty Town in Green Bay.
more, the population of Chicago was considerably less.

FurtherIn fact,

Chicago by the best available estimate had less than thirty-five
inhabitants in 1829.
until 1834. 58

Chicago never had more than 500 inhabitants

The lower population of Ohicago also was reflected

in the number of people engaged in the trade.

While the Green

Bay outfit had as many as twenty-two people utilizing goods worth

$9,000, Chicago never employed more than nine traders with the
same amount of goods. 59 Such figures, of course, do not mean
that individual traders were more successful.
o

The figures do,

nevertheless, represent a considerable profit for the Chicago outfit and the American Fur Company.
The economic and social effect of the American Fur Company
on the early life of Chicago was staggering.

While the community

of Green Bay was composed of several different elements, including fur traders, merchants of Shanty Town, and the military;
Chicago until 1828 was really nothing more than an outpost ot the
fur trade and the American Fur Company.

In

1825, Chicago had

r
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thirty-five eligible voters and fourteen tax payers.
property of qhicago was valued at $9,047.

The total

The largest segment

of this property, $$000, was owned by the American Fur Company
under the name of John Crafts.
only $4,047 on their own.

Thus, the people of Chicago held

Further examining the figures, one

can connect several names as associated with the American Fur
Company as either clerks or boatmen.

Adding their property to

the power of the American Fur Company, one finds that only $975
of the total property was in no way, or none that can be traced;
connected with the American Fur Company.60
The prosperous trade of the Chicago area did not last long,
Stuart, rather pleased over the successful tradirlg year in 182$,
sent John Kinzie an even greater supply of goods for the 1826-27
61
season confident that Kinzie could manage the whole affair.
Stuart's optimism was not justified.

In August, 1827, Stuart

had to report to John Astor that the Chicago outfit had suffered
a considerable loss.

This failure was blamed on the large number
of credits which Kinzie had not collected. 62 Another possible

explanation was that the Indian annuity pa1Ments upon which the
Chicago outfit had so heavily depended had been moved a considerable distance from Chicago.

63

Added to these reasons, there

was the natural depletion of game from the territory.

As early

as 1825, a government officer passing through Chicago had oommented that" • • • the quantity of game in this part of the
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country is diminishing very rapidly, and • • • it is barely
sufficient for the support of the Indians. • • n64
In 1827, John Kinzie sent his resignation to the American
Fur Company.

65

This was also the last year the American Fur

Company sent a large supply or goods to the Chicago area.

66

When

Kinzie resigned, Gurdon Hubbard also changed the character of his
trade.

Hubbard, in 1825, was one of the rew traders who realized

the changing character of the frontier.

He noticed that soon the
t,7
trade with the white population would be of primary importance. '
Knowing that Chicago was still a sparsely populated area with a
diminishing amount of game and Indians, Hubbard in 1827 moved to
Danville, Illinois.

Here he could conduct a brisk trade with the

greater white population.

In 1828, Hubbard sent a special request

to John Astor in New York to supply goods suitable for trade with
white settlers.

Hubbard could not obtain such goods at Mackinac

since their stock was still geared to the Indian hunter.

In

addition Robert Stuart objected to the forsaking of the fur trade
68
for a retail business.
Finally, in 1828, Hubbard became a partner in the Company
69
for the trade of the Illinois River district.
The American Fur
Company reluctantly agreed to furnish him with the necessary
goods both for trade with the whites and Indians.
longer wished to trade in the Chicago area.

Hubbard no

Instead, he bought

out the Company's rights at Danville and along the Illinois River
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where there was a greater concentration of population. The Compan7lo~reed

not to su?ply any other traders in that area if

H~bbard would assume their outstanding debts amounting to $$00. 70
With the resignation of John Kinzie and the departure of Gurdon
Hubbard, Jean Beaubien finally became the chief Chicago trader.
The American Fur Company now merely supplied traders on an individual basis.

For all intents and purposes, 1828 marked the

end of a fur trade society in Chicago.

The next decade brought

the Yank.e tmmigration, the Indian'. removal, and land speculation which would gradually transform Chicago into an urban center.

r
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CHAPTER VII
WITHDRAWAL OF

TH~

AMERICAN FUR COMPANY,

RISE

OF URBAN COMMUNITIES IN MILWAUKEE, GREEN BAY, AND CHICAGO
Before 1828, the fur trade had been an important economic
ingredient of the United States.

As the frontier moved westward,

the abundant trading grounds of the Northwest Territory declined.
In 1829, a Senate committee investigated the condition of the fur
trade.

Emphasis had been placed on such action because John Astor

had objected to the government allowing importation of furs dutyfree from foreigb countries.

Writing to the committee, Astor

claimed that his Company was financially destitute:
I believe I am safe when I say that all our
Indian traders for these twenty years, witf very
few exceptions, have been losing time and property
in that trade • • • • The American Fur Company have
for the years past, and do no. employ a capital
of a million dollars. They have not yet been able 1
to declare a dividend.
AlthoUFh Astor exaggerated the financial condition ot the
2
Company which was really doing quite well, he certainly spoke
the truth concerning the private taaders.

I doubt very much,

however, if their losses were due to foreign competition.

Thomas

Hart Benton, who headed the Senate committee, merely followed
Astor's viewpoint when he presented the oonclusions of the investigation.

The American fur trade was indeed in a depression, he

reported, and the principal reason was the inadequate tariff on
foreign furs.

3
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Although the fur trade was declining, it still provided the
principal occupation for the frontier inhabitants.

The Chicago

residents had little else to support their community.

In 1821,

thirteen people within the neighborhood of Chicago were actively
engaged in the trade.

The only significant change in the method

of the trade was due to the foresight of several American merchants.

Oliver Newberry, Brewster, Hayden, and Company, and Peck,

Walker and Company, although participating in the fur trade, relied more heavily on the exchange of goods for money.

Moet of

these firms operated from Detroit with a small warehouse in
Chicago. 4
The former employees of the American Fur Company still operated on essentially the same basis.

J. Beaubien received small

shipments of goods to exchange for furs.

Bernadus and David

Laughton located a small post on the Desp1aines River for trade
with the Potawatomies. 5

Since Laughton was expected to collect

only three to four hundred dollars worth of furs, his trade was
quite small. 6 The Laughtons supplemented their meager harvest
from the trade by operating a tavern.

In 1832, the traders were

informed that a final large profit could pos.ibly be garnered
7
when the Indian TreatY' of 1833 was held in Chi'ago.
The
Laughtons and the American Fur Company realized that with the
departure of the Indians, the fur trade would be little more than
a sport.
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The Indians, although the most essential element in the fur
trade, were in many respects a deterrent to the settlement of
this land.

Tales of their savagery were spread far and wide.

In

1832, however, the Blackhawk War ended the menace of any Indian
opposition to the tide of civilization in the Northwest.

The

War not only brought easterners news of the end of the Indian
treachery. but also the military reports informed them of the
fertile lands in the West.

e

The Indian Treaty ot 1833 was the

final step in opening the gates of the tur trade village ot
Chicago to a new era.

How the settlers Journeying over the Eri.

Canal, opened since 1825. could take advantage ot the Indian lands
ceded in 1833.
The Treaty ot 1833 was the last major accomplishment ot the
American Fur Company and individual traders in the Chicago area.
The Treaty purchased land trom the Indians and agreed to pay
white settlers tor property lost due to the Indian outrages.
These claims went as far back as the War ot 1812.

Many who came

to Chicago in 1833 wished to advance claims tor propertf supposedly stolen by the Indians, others were land speculators,
while the majority saw the opportunity to make a tast dollar
betore their Indian brother departed for lands west of the Miss.
issippi. 9 The American Fur Company was no exception. W. G.
Brewster, agent at Detroit, wrote to David Laughton requesting
him to consult all local traders who wished to present claims at
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the Treaty.

This was done in order that they might give Brewster
10
the power of attorney to handle their claims.
Robert Stuart

was also at the Treaty to push
American Fur Company.

throu~h

the enormous claim of the

Individual traders, such as Jacques Vieau

and 8010!\0. Juneau, arrived to present small claims; but, even
more importantly, they brought a large supply of goods to trade.

11

Interesting, too, was the tact that Governor Cass, Jean Beaubien,
12
The spokesand Gurdon Hubbard were wirnesses to the Treaty.
men tor the Indian tribes were Alexander Robinson and Billy
Caldwell, both of whom had been closely connected with the fur
trade and traders since the early 1820'..

13

Governor Porter, the

chief government commissioner, was a personal friend of the Kinzie
family.

The Kinzie family eventually drew large grant. from the

Treaty.

Many ot the goods distributed to the Indians by the gOY.

ernment were purchased from another Kinzie relation, Joseph
Kercheval. 14
Despite the predominance of fur trade personnel at the
Treaty, the most tlagrant violation against government laws and
the Indian's weltare was the wholesale introduction or liquor.
In 1832, the government held hearings on the shocking use or
liquor in trading with the Indians.

Eventually these hearings

resulted in the law or 1832 which introduced a strict regulation

a~ainst any use or liquor in the Indian trade. IS Yet at the
Chicago Treaty under the eyes of Governor Porter, Indian agent
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Owen of Chicago, and numerous local officials the traders plied
the Indians with -.hiskey to obtain their money.

Severa.l ob-

servers of the Treaty described how the Indians were paid in
fifty-cent pieces.

Every item sold by a trader, whether it be a

glass of whiskey or a loaf of bread, cost fifty-cents.
manner of conducting the

T~eaty

16

The

of 1833 was hardly a credit to

the government or the traders.
The Indians agreed to cede all lands west of I,ake Michigan
a~ounting

care

of

to five Million acres.

The government agreed to take

any debts levied against the tribes in B.ddi tion to pro-

viding l8.nds west of the MiSSissippi.

The second part of the

treaty enumerated outstanding debts which the Indians owed to the
white settlers.

The American Fur Company drew $17,000, the John

Kinzie family received $8,000, while Gurdon Hubbard obtained
nearly $6,000. 17

Furthe~ore, the John Kinzie family received

$25,000 for property lost during the War of 1812. 18
The Treaty ot 1833 met a hostIle reaction in Washington.
According to records, Governor Porter was charged with granting
large sums to individual traders, such as Kinzie and Hubbard,
when these
lompany_ 19

SUMS

were actually owed in debts to the American Fur

Finally, the government decided to send an agent to

Chicago to investigate the justice of these claims.
The most cursory consideration ot the Treaty of 1833 indicated that the American Fur Company received a large payment

,
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considerably out of proportion to the damages suffered.

Hardly

a year before this Treaty, Indian afent Owen of Chicago had sent
a note to Governor Porter claiming that 10s8e8 in the trade due
to Indian ravages had never amounted to more than a few dollars
20
in the Chicago area.
Then, just a year later, the American Fur
Company received nearly $17,000 for damages supposedly deriving
from Indian depredations in the Chicago trade.
The treaty brought forward another interesting aspect of
the trade.

None of the leading traders who drew payments from

the Treaty could claim the money as their own.

The Kinzie family,

which had drawn such a large sum, was faced with the debts that
John Kinzie) Senior had compiled during his early years in the
fur trade. 2l Gurdon Hubbard, who had for many years traded in
the ChicaFo area, was in debt to the American Fur Company for
$6,000.

Stuart even attempted to stop Hubbard's claim from

being paid on the grounds that the money rightfully belonged to
the Company.22

Jean Beaubien, who received nearly $),000 from

the Treaty of 18)), was eventually forced to

p~y

$2,000 of this
2)
sum to Ramaay Crooks tor debts due to the Company.
The Amer-

ican Fur Company not only reoeived a large claim from the Treaty
but was also able to oolleot the debts ot many former employeea,
The payments were espeoially significant in a judgment of the
fur trader's success.

The American Fur Company had exploited the

Chicago area for nearly twenty years, and many times derived
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large profits.

The traders, however, never realized profits.

Partly through their own oareless finan oia.1 habits and partly
through the exploitattve policies of the American Fur Company,
the Chicago tradera, in 1833, had little investment capital as
Chicago was about to enter a period ot commercial and industrial
growth.
Immediately atter the Treaty of 1833, Chicago experienced a
population boom.

The lands oeded to the United States were now'

opened tor settlement, and new industries and oocupations tollowed
the population growth.

In 1830, there had been a publio land

sale at Chioago at whioh 126 lots were sold at an average ot $35
per 10t. 24

Five years later, a government land otfioe was opened

in Chioago,whioh, trom then until 1837, sold approxtmately 588,
104 acres.

25

The population grew trom barely a hundred inhabitants in 1830 to nearly 3500 in 1835. 26 Almost as quiokly the

fur

Lend sales were oontrolled by
eastern speculators and town promoters. 27 The fur trader knew
trade~

passed into obsourity.

little about the urban complex springing up about him.

John

Kinzie, Jr., when he went to file preemption olaims tor the land
his father had settled, tailed to claim all the land that wal
rightfully his.

In his own words, Kinzie was happy with just

enough land to live on.

28 Gurdon Hubbard proved to be one of the

rew traders who aotually benetited from or oontributed to the
urban growth of Chicago.

In 1835, Hubbard invested in land speou-
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latlon.

He sold land ror $80,000, which earlier had cost him
only $5,000. 29 The new city now under the inrluence of spec-

ulators began new industries, agitated tor harbor improvement to
increase lake commerce, and drove to complete the IllinoisMichigan Canal. 30 All such moves were designed to incresse the
rate of commercial growth.

Chicago, indeed, had bridged the gap

between fur trade village and urban center.

The people who in-

itiated such changes were not even residents of the city two years
before.

The capital employed was derived trom land sales,

eastern banks, and government internal improvement schemes.
fur trader passed out ot Chicago history.

Ille

A few, such as the

descendants ot John Kinzie and Jean Beaubien, bridged the transi tion b,. opening hotels and taverns ,.
nevertheless.
community.

These were the exceptionu,

The fur traders rarely emerged as leaders of the

The actual course whioh the traders followed was not

clear because their names were not involved with the business ot
the new cit,..

Many remained in Chicago while others moved west-

ward where their skills were stIll required.
During the land boom in Chicago, the American Fur Company
also experienced a period of transition.
interest in 1834.
Ramsay Crooks.
of Chicago.

John J •. Astor sold his

The Company was immediately reorganized under

The Company had little part in the emerging city

Because the traders liquidated their debts to the

Company through the Treaty of 1833, the Americe.n Fur Company did
not own or have claim to any land in the Chicago area.

Since
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Crooks pursued a policy apainst selling goods to the white settlers,

31

he concluded all arrangements with Chicago in 1835 by

selling the Oompany's buildings and property to Jean Beaubien.

32

Milwaukee's rise as an urban community also began after the
Treaty .of 1833 when its lands were made available for sale to
the public.

Milwaukee had not been an integral part ot the fur

trade because it had merely been an occasional fur trading area.
As late as 1833, Milwaukee had no permanent residents.

Both

Solomon Juneau and Jacques Vieau merely traded there during the
winter.

There were no lands under cultivation or even claimed. 33

Apparently, Juneau was totally oblivious to the area's potential.
Through the reports of Major S. O. Stambaugh, the government's
commissioner to deal with the Menominees, the Milwaukee region
was extolled as fertile farming country and a possible lake
harbor. 34

The old traders of the Milwaukee region, however, knew

little of farming or lake commerce.

The more speculative eastern

immigrants were aware of the possibilities of the Milwaukee site.
As early as 1833, Morgan L. Martin, an enterprising frontier

35

lawyer, thought that'Bilwaukee would make an excellent lake port.
Martin forced Solomon Juneau to be a town builder and speculator.

He formed a partnership with Juneau, buying half his lake frontage
and agreeing to push through the pre-emption claims to the land.

36

Juneau would not have exploited Milwaukee's possibilities without
the skillful prodding of Morgan L. Martin.
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Even it Juneau had refused to cooperate with Martin, the
MilwaUkee area was sought by other promoters.

Byron Kilbourn,

who conducted the government's survey of the land, was so impressed that he bought tracts ot land in Milwaukee. 37
While men such as Kilbourn and Morgan L. Martin were promoting town development in Milwaukee, the men who had traded there
tor nearly twenty years remained unaware ot the changes.

Juneau

persisted in oonducting a faltering Indian trade until 1835.
Crooks had reluctantly oonsented to his supplying white settlers,
but clearly indioated that it was only a temporary oondition.
By 1836, Crooks had withdrawn trom the trade as he had done in
Chicago; and Solomon Juneau, through the goodness ot Morgan L.
Martin, became an important figure in the later growth ot
By 18)6, Juneau was building a tavern, improving the
)8
streets, and erecting a court house.
Finally, in 18)7, Solomon

Milwaukee.

Juneau became the mator of Milwaukee.

Without the prodding and

investment capital ot Morgan L. Martin, however, Juneau would
have remained a frontier trader.
The sucoess of the speoulative and enterprising sohemes ot
Martin and Kilbourn was assured in 1837.

The tirst publio neeting

in Milwaukee (now a oity ot 700 residents) disoussed the improvements needed to assure it the status ot a oommeroial center;
suitable roads, oanal oonnections with the Mississippi, and harbor
improvements. 39

Once again the pattern was clear.

Milwaukee was
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raised from a fur trade village to a commercial depot not by fur
traders, but by two enterprising speculators.

The fur trader had

little relation to the city of Milwaukee.
Green Bay followed a different line of development.

The fur

trade had proved unprofitable as early as 1826, and the American
element already had begun its town-building.

Yet Crooks and the

American Pur Company still chose to supply the Green Bay traders
with a small stock of gOOds. 40

The traders continued to sink into

debt, and the American Fur Company again wished to lay claim to
their private land holdings to liquidate the debt. 41
In 1831, a treaty with the Menominee Indians

~as

signed

which opened large tracts of land around Green Bay to settlement.
John Lawe filled large pre-emption claims, but most other Green
Bay residents only claimed the land on which they resided. 42

As

was true in Chicago, the speculators developed the land and determined the character of the new city.

By 18)2, Daniel Whitney

had laid out the town of Navarino about two miles south of the
old Shanty Town.

43

Gradually, Navarino attracted the new settlers.

The fur traders opposed these developments.

They had not re-

alized the value of their lands or the character of an urban
society, and

n •

• • it was not until the arrival of more enter-

pristng and grasping settlers, the keen and speculating Americana
(a class feared and hated by the former class (the fur traders»),
that these olaims were considered of any value, or worth the
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trouble and expense of obtaining titles to them."44
The American Fur Company played a major role in the later
settlement of Green Bay.

Never was the power of the Company ao

manifest and the poverty of the traders so terribly apparent than
in the final accounting of the Green Bay fur trade.

In

l8~,

when John Astor decided to retire from the Company, the Green
Bay traders were again faced with the task ot liquidat1ngtheir
debts.

Since the traders did not possess any capital, the Ameri-

can Fur Company asked tor their lands.

James D. Doty was

a~lhi:"-"·

pointed attorney tor the Company to settle accounta with the
traders. 45

To clear the debts, lands belonging to the Grignons,

Lawe, and Porlier were transferred to the Company.

46

Doty, how-

ever, argued that John Lawe should be allowed to retain much of
his land.

There were two reasons for this suggestion.

John Lawe

had been the first trader to acknowledge his debt_ thus influencing the other traders to do the same.

Secondly, Lawe's

long service to the Company necessitated a lenient policy especially since public opinion could turn against the Company.

47

Astor agreed to this plan allowing Lawe to retain certain plots
of land;

48

but, 1n the legal agreement, Lawe was remindea that

he still owed the Company more than $8000 1n cash. 49
There was good reason for Astor and Crooks to worry about
public opinion toward the American Pur Company in Green Bay.
Rather than withdraw entirely from Green Bay, the Company decided
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to keep the lands obtained and indulge in town-building.

In

1835, the town of Astor was plotted upon the lands formerly owned
by Lawe and the Grignons.

A contemporary resident described the

conditions that led to the

plo~ting

of Astor:

• • • The land was originally owned by John
Lawe and the Grigpon family_ Together with
other real estate, it was taken in payment of
balance due tpe old Green Bay Company to the
former Company; the debt having accrued by loss
in the Indian trade for in this business, it
generally happened that the small traders who
purchased their goods at high prices after years
of toil and privation spent in the trade, came
out with nothing • • • leaving to the great
monopoly, the lion's share of the profits.
The consideration received by the former owners
was trifling compared with the present value ot 50
the property. .
Astor's city was built in direct opposition to Navarino
owned by Daniel Whitney.

The rivalry between these two areas

slowed the economic development of the region.

Finally, in 1838,

the two villages were Joined:',in the city of Green Bay.
though, the transition was complete.

By 1835,

One historian ot Green Bay

accurately described the change:
By 1835, many of the old colonial custOMS had
passed awa,y; the village had lost somethine of
its primitive social character • • • • The
French inhabitants, never aggressive, retired
more and more within their own circle and
nationality while a more prime and Bober class
of Americans were filling the vacant places, and
stamping their influence on the manners and CU8tO~S
of the settlement~
51
Unable to adapt to the new civilization, Lawe and a few
other traders continued to exploit the Indian trade.

Lawe was

r
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still losing money, however, by depending on the Indian trade.
Yet Cx-ooks absolutely forbade his trading with white se.ttlers
unless the sale was for cash.

Lawe disregsrded Crook*'s in.struc-

tions; and, in 1835, he presented a list of $1000 in debts owed
by the white residents.

Crooks admonished Lawe for this uractice

saying " • • • you certainly lose more by bad debts, and you have
always done so, than you can possibly gain by the good ones, and
if you did not sell a dollar's worth at all to the whites, you
would be better orr."

Furthermore, Crooks instructed Lawe to stop

all sales to white settlers.

Lave's many friends had pre8sured

him into selling goods on credIt.

Rather than disappoint these

people, Lawe sold goods with the risk ot never obtaining the
money.

To forestall any further sales, Crooks relieved Lawe ot

the public pressure by informing the people that he did not trust
52
their credit.
In 1636, Crooks again agreed to supply Lawe with goods tor
the trade, yet it was clearly iridicated that this was the final
year.53

As in Chicago, Crooks awaited the payments designated

by the Treaty of 1836 with the· Menominee.

He even made a special

journey to Green Bay since he wa.
the more anxious to go bec8.use my presencII Blust
be valuable to our interests ~t Green Bay when
the payments are made under the Menominee Treaty,
when Mr. Lawe and his associates will receive a
pretty large SUM, and if lett to themselves, they
may preter buying goods tor the coming season's 54
trade to paying what they owe the lompany.
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Because John Lawe had criticized the Amerioan Fur Company's
business praotices, Ramsay Crooks teared Lawe might use theae
co~plalnts

as a pretext for not paying his debts,

55 Lawe was

particularly belligerent, for he felt that the COl'l1pany was closing
his outfit merely to arrange a contract with some other trader.

Crooks, however, explained to him that the Green Bay area was
being closed entirely.

The five per-cent commiss1.on charged on

the goods, Crooks claimed, hardly reimbursed the Company for the
eftort.

The only reason the American Fur Com.pany had oontinued

to send goods to Green Bay, Crooks pointed out, was the triendship they held for John Lawe.

56

In 1837, the total debts of the Green Bay traders still
amounted to the staggering sum of $27,000. 57

To be sssured that

he would receive a considerable sum tram the Indian Treaty, Lawe
j ourn.eyed to Washington where the tinal pa1D1ents were arranged.

58

From the Menominee Treaty of 1836, John Lawe received $12,000,
Augustin Grignon gained $10,000, and Porlier received $7,000.

59

Furthermore, the American Fur Company collected nearly $7,000 in
60
Lawe's name from the Treatr with the Winnebagoes and tho Sioux.

Aa late as 1839, John Lave received small shipments of goods
trom the Amerioan Fur Company_ He could not abandon the only
occupation that he knew.

Crooks continued to supply his needs,

but he stated that
We would preter to close all our affairs in your
quarter, and ahall be pleased to hear that fOU

104
have made better arrangements for your own
interest, than those that have recently existed between us, for we have only continued
under the impression that it was for the advantage and convenience of an old and muoh
•• tee.ed friend, not for the sa~e of the profit
the business gave us.
61
Green Bar had entered a period of urban growth.

The fur

traders, like John Lawe and the Grignons, remained in Green Bay;
but

~hey

were not an integral toroe in the life ot the city.

The fur trade society had now come full circle.

In the

initial stages, the American Fur Oompany had been the economic
basis of the Northwest Territory •. In the formation ot its monop011', the Company harassed local government otficials, contribute.d,
to the downfall of the factory system, and made the previously
independent trader a tool of a business enterprise.

Through the

lioensing problem ot the Green Bay traders from 1816 to 1819,
the oompetition with the taotory system from 1816 to 1822, the
prio. wars with independett traders, and the finanoing of the
Green Bay and Chicago outfits from 1816 to 1835 the busin.s.
operation. a~ policies of the Company were most clearly evident.
~

What,was the total effect ot the changing frontier sooiety'
What were the contributions ot the traders'

Ia terms ot tangible

reali ties, the fur trade society contributed 11 ttle. ,to
community.

~'l..

urban

The romantic ,description ot the tur traders as the

original architects of roads and water connections certafnly
holds 80me truth, but their contribution in terms ot investment

r
capital for commercial enterprise. or leadership tor political
and social lite was indeed slight.
of the tur

This was not alone the tault

The traders, like the Indians, were never

trader~

really considered during the process of change.

Antipathy was

created between the fur trader and the government at the very
out.et of the transitional period.

The factory system, the pre •

• enoe ot the military. and the changing laws in regards to
citizenship made the trader seriously question his place in the
new society.
Then ag"_$,!l_, the American Fur Compalll, WIlS ,!:>otll

ot_.

Am~r1dan

--'- .-.-

tl>:~. h:arl>1.ng~t:r

individualism
and the ruin of the tur trade societr.
..

'~'-"'.-'-""

"".

,-

.

Turner's concept ot democracr and the necessity ot individualism
on the frontier was really not operative between 1815-1834.
traders were part of a great monopoll.

The

They were forced, as in

the Green Bay Company, to buy'and sell the goods ot the American
Fur Company.

Atter 1815.
there was hardly a succ •.ss~llnde...
-.----~-~.~-

Pft_ruie~-trader . 1n._~~e

terrltQrl.

As 1$6 years progressed and

the 8bicago and Green Bay outtits t611 deeper into debt, their
property came under the control ot thH Company.

When the sudden

change, occasioned bl the sale of public lands, began in the
18)O's, the traders in Green Bay and Chicago lacked both the land
and the capital to invest in urban development.

Ramsay Crooks's

refusal to allow John Lawe or any of. the traders to' convert their
trade to a merchandise business with the white peptlers

pr~vent~d

r
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the possibility that the traders might adapt to the new economic
conditions of the frontier.
trader passed into obscurity.

Without land or capital, the fur
The fur traders did, however,

sustain the frontier communities until immigrants from the East
arrived with the necessary professional knowledge, technical
skill, and investment capital to complete the transition to an
urban society.

The fur trade and traders were indeed a stage in

the westward move.ent.
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